CCPR/C/116/D/2422/2014 6.4 The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the author’s claim under article 26 of the Covenant is inadmissible ratione loci and ratione materiae because article 26 does not have extraterritorial application and the State party therefore cannot be held responsible for violations of this article that may be committed outside its territory and jurisdiction by another State. The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.17 Under the particular circumstances of the case, the Committee does not consider examination of whether the State party violated article 26 to be distinct from examination of the violation of the author’s right under article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore considers that the author’s claims in this regard are incompatible with article 2 of the Covenant, and inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 6.5 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee considers that the communication is admissible insofar as it raises issues under article 7 of the Covenant and proceeds with its examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as required under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal18 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin. 19 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it can be established that the assessment was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 20 7.3 The Committee notes the State party’s observations that the Refugee Appeals Board did not find it credible that the author would face a risk of ill treatment if returned to Armenia. The Committee also notes the author’s assertion that he provided detailed, consistent and credible responses to the questions raised by the domestic immigration authorities, and that the decision of the Board was arbitrary and erroneous. Specifically, the Committee notes the author’s arguments that the Board did not convincingly articulate why it found implausible the following statements by the author: (a) that he had lived in Belarus; 17 18 19 20 See general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 12. See, inter alia, communications No. 2393/2014, K v. Denmark, Views adopted on 16 July 2015, para. 7.3; No. 2272/2013, P.T. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 1 April 2015, para. 7.2; and No. 2007/2010, X v. Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 9.2. See X v. Denmark, para. 9.2; and communication No. 1833/2008, X. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 1 November 2011, para. 5.18. See, inter alia, K v. Denmark, para. 7.4. 11