CAT/C/60/D/602/2014 Movement himself, that his political activity was limited to participating in one demonstration and that he provided contradictory statements regarding the events surrounding his ill-treatment and arrest. The Committee notes that, even if it were to discount the above-mentioned inconsistencies and accept these claims as true, the complainant has not provided any evidence that the authorities in the Sudan have been looking for him in the recent past or were otherwise interested in him. The Committee further takes note of the complainant’s position that the authorities should have ordered a medical examination, to prove or disprove whether he had been subjected to torture in the past. 8.7 The Committee observes that a medical examination requested by a complainant to prove the acts of torture that he or she has allegedly suffered should, in principle, be conducted, regardless of the authorities’ assessment of the credibility of the allegation, so that the authorities deciding on a given case of forcible return are able to complete the assessment of the risk of torture objectively, on the basis of the results of that medical examination, without any reasonable doubt. In the particular circumstances of the present case, however, the Committee takes note of the period of time elapsed since the events in 2007, and recalls that, although past events may be of relevance, the principal aim of its assessment is to determine whether the complainant currently runs the risk of being subjected to torture upon his return to the Sudan. 29 The Committee recalls that ill-treatment suffered in the past is only one element to be taken into account, the relevant question before the Committee being whether the complainant currently runs a risk of torture if returned to the Sudan.30 The Committee considers that, even if it were assumed that the complainant was tortured by the Sudanese authorities in the past, it does not automatically follow that, at least 10 years after the alleged events occurred, he would still be at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to the Sudan. 31 8.8 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence whereby the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory, and indicates that it is generally for the complainant to present an arguable case. 32 In the light of the considerations above, and on the basis of all the information submitted by the complainant and the State party, including on the general situation of human rights in the Sudan, the Committee considers that the complainant has not adequately demonstrated the existence of substantial grounds for believing that his return to the Sudan would expose him to a real, specific and personal risk of torture, as required under article 3 of the Convention. 9. Accordingly, the Committee, acting under article 22 (7) of the Convention, is of the view that the return of the complainant to the Sudan would not constitute a breach of article 3 of the Convention. 29 30 31 32 See communications No. 61/1996, X, Y and Z v. Sweden, Views adopted on 6 May 1998, para. 11.2 and No. 435/2010, G.B.M. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14 November 2012, para. 7.7. See, for example, communications No. 61/1996, X, Y and Z v. Sweden, Views adopted on 6 May 1998, para. 11.2; No. 435/2010, G.B.M. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14 November 2012, para. 7.7; No. 458/2011, X. v. Denmark, decision adopted on 28 November 2014, para. 9.5. See, for example, communication No. 431/2010, Y. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 21 May 2013, para. 7.7 and No. 458/2011, X. v. Denmark, decision adopted on 28 November 2014, para. 9.5. See communications No. 298/2006, C.A.R.M. et al. v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2007, para. 8.10; No. 256/2004, M.Z. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 12 May 2006, para. 9.3; No. 214/2002, M.A.K. v. Germany, decision adopted on 12 May 2004, para. 13.5; No. 150/1999, S.L. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 11 May 2001, para. 6.3; and No. 347/2008, N.B.-M. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 14 November 2011, para. 9.9. 11