CAT/C/60/D/602/2014 an appeal against the decisions of the Refugee Appeals Board even in cases such as his, where the Board was split when deciding the case. A minority of Board members wanted the complainant to be granted asylum or to allow for a medical examination before making the final decision. This was, however, overruled by the majority of members, which issued a negative decision. The complainant maintains that, as a matter of fair trial, it should be allowed that such a decision can be examined at a higher level, but this is not allowed in the State party. Consequently, he agrees with the State party that the Committee is in fact being used as an appellate body, but he contests the assertion that the Committee should give any weight to the findings made by a majority of members of the Board, since these were made without the “proper basis” — in his case, a medical torture examination. 5.3 The complainant maintains that the Committee should consider his communication admissible, and rejects the argument that he failed to establish a prima facie case. 5.4 The complainant refers to the Committee’s decision in the case of Amini v. Denmark11 and in the case of K.H. v. Denmark (para. 4.5), and notes that, in both cases, the Refugee Appeals Board considered that the complainants had lied about the torture they had suffered, no medical examination was allowed, but both complainants were able to undergo a torture examination free of charge, conducted by the doctors at the Amnesty International Danish Medical Group. Since asylum seekers in Denmark are not allowed to work, they have no income that would allow them to pay for such a medical examination themselves. Consequently, many asylum seekers who were not allowed a medical torture examination by the Danish authorities apply for the free examination by Amnesty International. The organization can only process a limited number of cases and, so far, the complainant’s case has not been among them, even though he has applied. He maintains that it is the State party to the Convention which should be responsible for allowing such medical torture examinations, and not the complainant, who has no financial means, or nongovernmental organizations with limited resources and reliant on volunteers. 5.5 The complainant refers to the case of a Turkish national of Kurdish origin who was claiming asylum due to the torture he suffered before fleeing, and where the Refugee Appeals Board ordered a medical torture examination and subsequently granted him asylum based on the results. The decision of the Board was postponed until the Board had the results of this medical examination.12 The complainant maintains that this was the “correct procedure” that should also have been followed in his case, because it was of paramount importance to establish whether the complainant had been tortured before fleeing, in order to allow for an assessment of whether he would be subjected to torture (again) on his return. In support, the complainant referred to the Committee’s jurisprudence in the cases of Arana v. France, 13 Agiza v Sweden 14 and Chun Rong v. Australia. 15 He also referred to the Committee’s decision in the case of K.H. v. Denmark (para. 8.8), where the Committee had explicitly held that, by rejecting the complainant’s asylum request without seeking further investigation on his claims or ordering a medical examination, the State party had failed to determine whether there were substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned, and had found a violation of article 3. 5.6 The complainant further refers to two decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, A.A. v. France and A.F. v. France,16 in which the applicants were asylum seekers from the Sudan. In both cases, the Court had found France in violation of article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is based, inter alia, on a very precise examination of background information about the human rights situation in the Sudan. In the second decision, the Court had stated that it was likely that 11 12 13 14 15 16 16 6 See communication No. 339/2008, Amini v. Denmark, decision adopted on 15 November 2010, paras. 9.8 and 9.9. Case file No. 1-30-449.774, no copy provided by the complainant. See communication No. 63/1997, Arana v. France, Views adopted on 9 November 1999. See communication No. 233/2003, Agiza v Sweden, decision adopted on 20 May 2005, para. 13.7. See communication No. 416/2010, Chun Rong v. Australia, decision adopted on 5 November 2012. See European Court of Human Rights, A.A. v. France, (application No. 18039/11), judgment of 15 April 2015; A.F. v. France (application No. 80086/13), judgment of 15 April 2015. See European Court of Human Rights, A.A. v. France, (application No. 18039/11), judgment of 15 April 2015; A.F. v. France (application No. 80086/13), judgment of 15 April 2015.