CCPR/C/112/D/2053/2011 that provision cannot be dissociated from his claims under articles 6 and 7, which must be determined on the merits.10 6.6 The Committee declares the communication admissible insofar as it appears to raise issues under articles 6, paragraph 1, 7 and 18 of the Covenant, and proceeds to their consideration on the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as required under article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that, as a result of his conversion from Islam to Christianity in 1994, he would face physical harm or may be killed by the Mourides Brotherhood or his own family should he be returned to Senegal. The Committee notes the author’s claim that in November 1994, he was attacked by his family, which threatened to have a fatwa issued by the Mourides Brotherhood against him; and that after he escaped to the town of Kaolack, he was located and severely beaten up by his family, along with other members of the Mourides Brotherhood. The Committee also notes the author’s contention that no State protection is available to him in Senegal. The Committee notes that the Refugee Review Tribunal, while it accepted most of the facts of the case, was not satisfied that the author would face a risk of harm from the Mourides Brotherhood, and determined that adequate State protection would be available in Senegal. 7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.11 The Committee also recalls that, generally speaking, it is for the organs of States parties to the Covenant to review or evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists.12 7.4 In the present case, the Committee observes that the author’s refugee claim was thoroughly examined by the State party’s authorities, which concluded that the author did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. The author did not seek judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal rejecting his claim, and does not assert any procedural irregularity in the RRT decision. The Committee notes that RRT accepted that the author had converted to Christianity in 1994; that in November 1994, some members of his family attacked him and left him without food for three days; and that later in Kaolack, where he had escaped, he was located and attacked by members of his family and some members of the Mourides Brotherhood. RRT concluded that any threat to the author came from his family and their associates, but not from the Mourides Brotherhood as such, and it rejected the author’s contention that no adequate and effective State protection would be available to him elsewhere in Senegal. The Committee also notes that the author has not put forward any other reason why he could not relocate within Senegal. The Committee observes that the author has not identified any risk factor that the State party’s authorities 10 11 12 10 See communication No. 2007/2010, X. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 8.4. See general comment No. 31[80] on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 12. See communication No. 1763/2008, Pillai et al. v. Canada, Views adopted on 25 March 2011, para. 11.4. See also communications No. 1819/2008, A.A. v. Canada, inadmissibility decision adopted on 31 October 2011, para. 7.8, and No. 2049/2011, Z. v. Australia, Views adopted on 18 July 2014, para. 9.3.