CAT/C/64/D/615/2014 further submits that the complainant could have even sought leave from the Federal Court to apply for judicial review of any Refugee Protection Division or humanitarian and compassionate application decisions. 4.4 In addition, the State party submits that the complainant has not sufficiently substantiated her allegations that she fears a real and personal risk of harm in Uganda, and that her removal would be a violation of article 3 of the Convention. The State party recalls the Committee’s jurisprudence in its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 229 that article 3 places the burden upon the complainant to establish that she would personally be at risk and that the grounds on which a claim is established must go beyond mere theory or suspicion. The State party argues that that approach has consistently been adopted by the Committee in numerous cases. 10 Recalling the evaluation test for the risk of torture as described in general comment No. 1, 11 the State party concludes that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Uganda. The State party further submits that it is not the Committee’s role to weigh evidence or reassess findings of fact made by domestic courts or tribunals.12 It notes that the complainant’s allegations have been considered by competent and impartial domestic procedures that did not find a personal risk for the complainant if returned to Uganda. Moreover, the complainant failed to provide evidence that she has been subjected to torture in the past and that she faces a foreseeable and personal risk of torture if returned to Uganda. The State party relies on the findings of the two pre-removal risk assessment officers who concluded that the complainant would not be subjected to a risk of persecution, torture, threat to life or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if returned to Uganda. The second preremoval risk assessment decision noted that the complainant had not lived in Uganda for 12 years, and that there was insufficient evidence that the she would be targeted for any reason when returned. Finally, Citizenship and Immigration Canada took into consideration the country conditions and the personal circumstances of the complainant, and concluded that she was not a person in need of protection. 4.5 The State party notes that the complainant submitted new evidence to the Committee, including letters from the complainant’s family and from individuals and organizations in Canada. However, that evidence was given no weight by the Committee since it was not first-hand information and did not establish that the complainant would face a real and personal risk of torture if she were returned to Uganda. The evidence, including a petition containing more than 2,000 signatures calling on Canada not to deport the complainant given the risks she could face as a lesbian in Uganda and a transcript of the House of Commons debate on 4 June 2014, was submitted without establishing any evidence of a personal risk of torture for the complainant if returned to Uganda. In that context, the State party observes that the complainant also failed to request an administrative deferral of removal from the Canada Border Services Agency, as individuals alleging new evidence of a personal risk may request a deferral of a removal order against them from a Canada Border Services Agency enforcement officer. The Federal Court of Appeal has held that an enforcement officer must defer removal if there is compelling evidence that the removal would expose the person to a risk of death, extreme sanction or inhuman treatment. The complainant could also have applied for leave to seek judicial review of a decision denying an administrative deferral of removal, and could have brought a motion for stay of removal pending the outcome of the judicial review application. 4.6 On the other hand, the State party acknowledges that the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Uganda is problematic, especially due to the Anti-Homosexuality Act adopted in 2014. While certain consensual same-sex conduct was 9 10 11 12 Replaced by the Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, as of 6 December 2017. See X v. Netherlands (CAT/C/16/D/36/1995), para. 7.2; Dadar v. Canada (CAT/C/35/D/258/2004), para. 8.3; S.P.A. v. Canada (CAT/C/37/D/282/2005), para. 7.1; C.A.R.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/38/D/298/2006), para. 8.7; and T.I. v. Canada, para. 7.3. See Kalonzo v. Canada, paras. 9.2–9.3. See A.K. v. Australia (CAT/C/32/D/148/1999), para. 6.4; and G.A. van Meurs v. Netherlands (CCPR/C/39/D/215/1986), para. 7.1. 5