E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2 page 17 D. Denial of access to the lock-up of the National Security Service Office in Tashkent 53. On 4 December, after having to wait for more than half an hour outside in bad weather, the Special Rapporteur was denied access by the Deputy Head of the SNB to the SNB lock-up in Tashkent. He said that the visit should have been announced and that pre-trial detainees under investigation can only meet with persons external to the criminal process with the formal approval of the investigator in the case. The Special Rapporteur notes that in his initial meeting with the same official the terms of reference of the mission had been clearly spelt out. In particular, reference had been made to the requirement to have immediate access to any place of detention and to any persons deprived of their liberty, including on an unannounced basis. The Special Rapporteur furthermore observes that during a prior meeting with the Deputy Head of the SNB, the latter had indicated that his Office had broad experience with the work of the ICRC and that the principle of confidential interviews with detainees had been adhered to. It is the understanding of the Special Rapporteur that the methods of work of the ICRC as far as visits of places of detention and interviews with detainees are concerned are very similar to his own methods. He considers this incident to be a serious breach of the terms of reference that had been agreed upon by the Uzbek authorities. The matter was immediately raised with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It must be noted that a large number of torture allegations received by the Special Rapporteur relate to the SNB lock-up in Tashkent (see appendix II). 54. In relation to the respect for the terms of reference of the mission, the Special Rapporteur notes that in a number of instances during the visit in the Ferghana Valley, contacts between the Special Rapporteur and representatives of civil society appeared to have been closely monitored by the authorities. Officials introducing themselves as SNB officers were reported to have questioned private individuals whom the Special Rapporteur was to meet. Phone lines were also cut after contacts were established between representatives of civil society organizations and the Special Rapporteur’s delegation. The matter was raised at the time with the official accompanying him. During interviews with detainees at the prison of Andijan, it also became clear that the latter had been warned by the prison authorities not to complain to the Special Rapporteur. Similarly, alleged tuberculosis patients currently held at the prison infirmary could not describe either their symptoms, or the treatment they were receiving. They praised the prison administration for the conditions of detention. E. Impunity 55. Very few torture complaints seem to be investigated, whether they are made during the pre-trial investigation period or at trial. Various officials referred to two recent cases in which law enforcement officers were sentenced to prison terms after having been convicted of torture (see the case of Ali Muhammad Mamadaliev and Ravshan Haitov in appendix II). The Deputy Head of the SNB stressed that incidents of torture were rare as great attention had traditionally been paid to the training of investigators, including in respecting human rights at all stages of the process. He referred to the Mamadaliev case as being the only one. The General Procurator told the Special Rapporteur that in the 10 first months of 2002, 40 members of the MVD had had criminal charges brought against them, including for offences such as abuse of authority and hiding of information. In particular, he referred to the Haitov case in which his Office had sent an investigation team to the police station concerned and had launched a criminal case resulting in long prison terms. The Minister of Internal Affairs stated that his Ministry was dealing very