GÄFGEN v. GERMANY JUDGMENT 45 (c) The third-party interveners (i) J.’s parents 158. In the submission of J.’s parents, the applicant’s trial had fulfilled the requirements of Article 6. At the trial, the applicant had never indicated that he had felt coerced to confess but had repeated that he was making his statements freely and out of respect for his victim’s family. They claimed that the applicant had already confessed on the second day of the trial that he had suffocated J., even though he had denied, at that moment, that he had planned to do so before abducting him. In his later statement he had subsequently admitted that he had planned from the outset to kill the boy. 159. J.’s parents further underlined that the applicant had confirmed in his final statement that, owing to the exclusion of his pre-trial statements, he had been given the choice of remaining silent or of making a confession and that it was not as if everything had been established. He had claimed that he had made a full and free confession even though he had recognised the risk that it would not have any (mitigating) effect on the trial court’s judgment. In a book published subsequently by the applicant (entitled “Alone With God – The Way Back”; see paragraph 85 above) there was no mention that his confession at the trial had been caused as a consequence of the police interrogation. In that book, he had confirmed, regarding his motives for making a new confession at his trial, that he had wished to express remorse and had therefore described his acts in detail, at the risk – which materialised – that his confession might not have any effect on his sentence (pp. 225-26). His conduct in the proceedings had not, therefore, been a response to the trial court’s decision to admit the impugned evidence. (ii) The Redress Trust 160. The Redress Trust underlined that the rationale of the exclusionary rule which prohibited the admission of evidence obtained by torture or illtreatment was based upon (i) the unreliability of evidence obtained as a result of torture; (ii) the outrage to civilised values caused and represented by torture; (iii) the public-policy objective of removing any incentive to undertake torture anywhere in the world; (iv) the need to ensure protection of the fundamental rights (to due process and fairness) of the party against whose interest the evidence was tendered; and (v) the need to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. 161. Numerous international declarations, rules, resolutions and conventions prohibited the admission of statements obtained by torture or inhuman treatment as evidence in judicial proceedings. In the Redress Trust’s view, it was arguable that the exclusionary rule covered not only confessions but also derivative evidence found as a result of a statement made under torture, notwithstanding that Article 15 of the United Nations