9.11.2017 A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 (11 August 2004) by their experiences, to be part of a United Kingdom based terrorist support network able to carry out attacks in or against the United Kingdom. The derogation is properly seen as related to Al Qa'eda and its associates. The "international terrorist group" contemplated by section 21 is Al Qa'eda or a group associated with it, provided it is recognised that the very nature of the groups associated with Al Qa'eda encompasses informal, even ad hoc, groups which can as easily or better be described as overlapping, loosely co-ordinated groupings or networks. Their purposes may overlap in part but not in whole, and they may not agree with all the means which another would use; but that does not prevent them being part of the threat to the life of the nation as a matter of principle or law. It is that connection to Al Qa'eda which provides the threat rather than a desire for a particular type of atrocity, because it is Al Qa'eda and its associates which provide the threat to the nation by whatever means they consider further their anti-western agenda and through whomsoever they operate directly or indirectly." 220. Given these findings, it can be seen that Mr Gill's argument on the derogation issue, if it were accepted, would confine the application of ATCSA Part IV to a scope or compass much narrower than is required for the fulfilment of the Act's policy and objects. That is sufficient to condemn the submission. There might, of course, be a case where, through bad or inapt drafting, the court felt driven to conclude that a statute's policy and objects could not be met because the words used simply did not allow it. But that is not so here. The term "group" is perfectly apt to encompass the kind of loose-knit associations which SIAC describes. 221. I should add that it seems to me that Mr Gill's argument is also flawed by another mistake, which I think is of some importance. He submits that because "[t]he powers in s.21 have a grossly detrimental effect on fundamental human rights" they must be narrowly construed. Now, I certainly accept that the court will be very astute indeed to see that a claimed power of executive detention on grounds only of suspicion and belief enjoys a solid justification on the words of the statute. But that engages the scrutiny issue. In the context of the derogation issue such a claimed power in my judgment offers no basis upon which to shrink the reach of the Act's policy and objects. If anything, the reverse: the legislature's choice of belief and suspicion as the test for certification and thus detention tends to support the view that the target of the Act's policy includes those who belong to loose, amorphous, unorganised groups. At the least it is consistent with such a view. The derogation issue is the wrong territory in which to sound the drum of individual rights. In this territory, the loudest noise is the Al Qa'eda threat, in all its manifestations. 222. For all these reasons I consider that Mr Gill's submissions on the derogation issue have no force whatever, and I would reject them. THE SCRUTINY ISSUE 223. Earlier I characterised Mr Gill's submission on this issue as being to the effect "that SIAC applied an insufficiently rigorous standard of scrutiny, of the facts and of the Secretary of State's case, in the exercise of its appellate function under ATCSA s.25". That was I hope a convenient summary. However on the face of it the argument, certainly as articulated in Mr Gill's skeleton, contains a number of different strands; but they are extremely repetitive. Thus it is said that the grounds for belief and suspicion under ss.21 and 25 must point "unequivocally and strongly to the conclusion" that the person in question is an international terrorist and a risk to national security. Then exception is taken to SIAC's comment in paragraph 71 of the open generic judgment that [the test for reasonable grounds for the relevant belief and suspicion] "is not a demanding standard for the Secretary of State to meet". Mr Gill submits by contrast that the Secretary of State must in fact meet a very demanding or exacting standard. Then it is said that where the case is not urgent, the test for reasonable belief and suspicion must be the more stringent, there being more scope for the Secretary of State to investigate the circumstances. Mr Gill reminded us that C had been under investigation for many months and D since February 1999. Next it is submitted that the powers granted are so intrusive as to require "an extremely strong basis for suspicion". Next, that suspicion must be based on the establishment of objective and verifiable facts, so that there is more than a prima facie case of the kind required in the law of crime to justify the detention of a suspect before charge. http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1123.html 55/113