A/59/324 II. The absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 13. Since the submission of his previous reports to the General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur has received with serious concern allegations of attempts to circumvent the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture and other forms of illtreatment in the name of countering terrorism, particularly in relation to the interrogation and conditions of detention of prisoners. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur would like to draw attention to his previous reports (see A/57/173, paras. 2-35 and A/58/128, paras. 11-22). 14. Legal arguments of necessity and self-defence, invoking domestic law, have recently been put forward, aimed at providing a justification to exempt officials suspected of having committed or instigated acts of torture against suspected terrorists from criminal liability. While being aware of the threats posed by terrorism and recognizing the duty of States to protect their citizens and the security of the State against such threats, the Special Rapporteur would like to reiterate that the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment means that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for torture. 15. The condoning of torture is per se a violation of the prohibition of torture. Moreover, domestic law cannot be invoked as a justification for failure to comply with international treaty obligations and customary international law. The Special Rapporteur wishes to recall that no executive, legislative, administrative or judicial measure authorizing recourse to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment can be considered as lawful under international law and, therefore, any measure of that kind would engage the State’s responsibility, whether it be an act of torture directly committed by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or any other person acting in an official capacity on behalf of that State. A head of State, also in his or her capacity as commander-inchief, should therefore not authorize his or her subordinates to use torture, or guarantee immunity to the authors and co-authors of and accomplices to torture. The argument that public officials have used torture having been advised by lawyers or experts that their actions were permissible is not acceptable either. No special circumstance may be invoked to justify a violation of the prohibition of torture for any reason, including an order from a superior officer or a public authority.1 16. The Special Rapporteur notes with serious concern that attempts have been made to narrow the scope of the definition of torture contained in article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. For instance, torture has reportedly been defined elsewhere as physical pain that is difficult to endure, and which should be equivalent to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. Similarly, it has reportedly been argued that some harsh methods should not be considered as torture, but merely as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and therefore not absolutely prohibited and permissible in exceptional circumstances. In particular, it was reportedly asserted that permissible methods of interrogation could include the deprivation of essential 5