CCPR/C/128/D/2789/2016 standing jurisprudence in which the supervisory review procedure is deemed ineffective. 8 The author also reiterates that her father’s counsel filed a supervisory review request, which was rejected by the Deputy Prosecutor General and the Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the submission of such a request can only delay the execution of the death penalty, since it suspends the execution of the death penalty during the consideration of the request, but does not constitute an effective remedy in other respects. 5.2 The author notes that, pursuant to article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee does not consider communications until it ascertains that the author has exhausted all available domestic remedies. However, the Committee’s jurisprudence indicates that the rule of exhaustion applies only if legal protection is effective and available. The author recalls the Committee’s jurisprudence that the supervisory review procedure concerning court decisions that have entered into force constitutes an extraordinary remedy of a discretionary nature, which is limited to legal matters and therefore is not an effective remedy for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.9 The author further recalls that a system of supervisory review that only applies to sentences whose execution has commenced does not meet the requirements of article 14 (5), regardless of whether such review can be requested by the convicted person or is dependent on the discretionary power of a judge or prosecutor.10 5.3 The author states that a person sentenced to death in Belarus usually learns about the refusal to grant a supervisory review request a few minutes before the execution. She claims that the death penalty in Belarus is carried out in conditions of secrecy. Before the execution, the convicted person, his or her lawyer and his or her family are not informed about the outcome of the request. Therefore, the person sentenced to a death penalty has no time to appeal to the Human Rights Committee upon rejection of the internal appeals. 5.4 As to the State party’s argument that the procedure of applying for a pardon from the President of Belarus has not been exhausted as an available domestic remedy, the author points out that it is not a procedure that must be exhausted before applying to the Committee and that it constitutes a legal procedure of a humanitarian nature and not a legal remedy for the violation of rights. The author recalls that according to the Committee’s well-established jurisprudence, this procedure does not constitute an effective domestic remedy for purposes of exhaustion.11 The author states that according to the regulations on the procedure of implementation in Belarus of pardons of convicted persons, 12 the execution of a sentence against a person sentenced to death is to be suspended during the consideration and until the refusal of a request for pardon. The author states that a person sentenced to death in Belarus usually learns about the refusal to grant a pardon a few minutes before the execution. Lack of cooperation by the State party 6.1 The Committee notes that the State party failed to respect the Committee’s request for interim measures by executing the author’s father before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication. 6.2 The Committee recalls that under article 39 (2) of the Covenant, it is empowered to establish its own rules of procedure, which the States parties have agreed to recognize. The Committee further observes that, by adhering to the Optional Protocol, a State party to the Covenant recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant (Optional Protocol, preamble and art. 8 9 10 11 12 See, among others, Bandajevsky v. Belarus (CCPR/C/86/D/1100/2002). See, for example, Torres Ramirez v. Uruguay, communication No. 4/1977; Gelazauskas v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/77/D/836/1998); Bandajevsky v. Belarus; Korolko v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/100/D/1344/2005); Umarov v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/100/D/1449/2006); Gerashchenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/97/D/1537/2006); P.L. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/102/D/1814/2008); and Tulzhenkova v. Belarus (CCPR/C/103/D/1838/2008). Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 50. See, for example, Singarasa v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001) and Chisanga v. Zambia (CCPR/C/85/D/1132/2002). Approved by a decree of the President of Belarus dated 3 December 1994. 5