CCPR/C/128/D/2789/2016 a prosecutor’s office against a judgment having the force of res judicata does not constitute an effective remedy that has to be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.16 It also considers that filing requests for supervisory review with the president of a court directed against court decisions that have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge constitutes an extraordinary remedy and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. 17 The State party has not shown, however, whether and in how many cases the petition to the president of the Supreme Court for supervisory review procedures were applied successfully in cases concerning the right to a fair trial. In such circumstances the Committee finds that article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol does not preclude it from considering the communication.18 7.4 With regard to the requirements laid down in article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee also takes note of the State party’s argument that Mr. Yakovitsky had not exhausted all domestic remedies at the time of submission of the communication, in particular in view of the fact that his application for a presidential pardon was still pending. In this regard, and in the light of the information regarding the execution of Mr. Yakovitsky, the Committee reiterates its previous jurisprudence, according to which the presidential pardon is an extraordinary and extrajudicial remedy,19 and as such does not constitute an effective remedy for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. Furthermore, in the present case, the pardon could not on its own have constituted a sufficient remedy for the violations alleged. Therefore, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from considering the communication. 7.5 The Committee further takes note of the author’s allegation that the presence of investigators or prison authorities did not allow for confidential attorney-client meetings to take place between her father and his counsels. In this regard, the Committee notes the State party’s objection that the author’s father did not file any complaint about violations of his right to communicate confidentially with his counsels. In the absence of further information, the Committee is unable to establish whether domestic remedies have been exhausted with regard to this particular claim under article 14 (3) (b) and (d) of the Covenant, and considers that it is precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from considering this part of the communication. 7.6 The Committee takes note of the allegations that the rights of the author’s father under article 9 (1), (2) and (4) and article 14 (1) and (2), in relation to the special clothing for persons sentenced to death, and article 14 (3) (a), (b) and (d) of the Covenant were violated. It notes that the State party has stated that the author did not file any complaint about other violations of his rights. In the absence of further information, the Committee is unable to establish whether domestic remedies have been exhausted with regard to the claims under article 9 (1), (2) and (4) and article 14 (1) and (2) in relation to the special clothing for persons sentenced to death, and article 14 (3) (a), (b) and (d) of the Covenant and considers that it is precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from considering this part of the communication. 7.7 The Committee considers that the author’s remaining claims, raising issues under articles 6 (1) and (2), 9 (3) and 14 (2) of the Covenant, have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and proceeds to their examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the case in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 16 17 18 19 Alekseev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009), para 8.4. Gelazauskas v. Lithuania, para 7.4; Sekerko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/109/DR/1851/2008), para. 8.3; Protsko and Tolchin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/109/D/1919-1920/2009), para. 6.5; Schumilin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1784/2008), para. 8.3; and P.L. v. Belarus, para. 6.2. See, among others, Kostenko v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/115/D/2141/2012), para. 6.3; and Dorofeev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/111/D/2041/2011), para. 9.6. Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, para. 6.4; Chisanga v. Zambia, para. 6.3; Kovaleva and Kozyar v. Belarus, para. 10.4; and Selyun v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2289/2013), para. 6.3. 7