CAT/OP/CYP/1 visit, as these conditions represent an obstacle to free access to places of detention. Moreover, the provisions are not in compliance with articles 1, 2, 4, 19 and 20 of the Optional Protocol, among others. 88. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party repeal, as a matter of urgency, subsections (2) and (3) of section 5 of Law No. 2 (III) of 2009 and ensure that the national preventive mechanism has the right, in practice, to visit all places of deprivation of liberty in Cyprus, without preconditions and in line with the Optional Protocol. 2. Legal framework: structure and independence 89. The Subcommittee is concerned about the lack of functional independence of the national preventive mechanism, as set out under subsection (1) of section 4 of Law No. 2 (III) of 2009. While there is no single model for an Optional Protocol-compliant national preventive mechanism structure, it is clear that when national human rights institutions are designated as national preventive mechanisms their particular structures must be examined in order to ensure that the mechanism can fulfil its mandate. Experience suggests that a national preventive mechanism can most effectively exercise its mandate when it is located within a separate unit of the national human rights institution. In Cyprus, this does not appear to be the case. Moreover, the national preventive mechanism of Cyprus should have full operational autonomy with regard to its staff, but it does not. The mechanism does not have any staff working exclusively for it and those who do spend some of their time on mechanism-related activities must fit that work in and around other duties. That situation makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for the mechanism to take a systematic and planned approach. 90. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party amend subsection (1) of section 4 of Law No. 2 (III) of 2009 in order to establish the national preventive mechanism as a fully independent structure within the Office of the Commissioner, with its own staff and budget (see CAT/OP/12/5, para. 24). 3. Resources 91. The Subcommittee is concerned that the designation of the Office of the Commissioner as the national preventive mechanism of Cyprus has not been accompanied by the allocation of sufficient additional resources, including human resources. The Subcommittee reminds the State party that, pursuant to article 18 (3) of the Optional Protocol, States parties are required to make available the necessary resources for the functioning of the national preventive mechanism. Without proper resources, including in terms of staffing, the mechanism cannot fulfil its preventive mandate. 92. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party allocate, as a matter of priority, the financial resources needed by the national preventive mechanism, as required by the Optional Protocol and the Subcommittee’s guidelines for such mechanisms (see CAT/OP/12/5, para. 11), and as set out in the national preventive mechanism assessment matrix. 3 If the mechanism is to have functional independence, it must have full control over its staff and not be dependent on the decisions of other State bodies. 93. The Subcommittee is also concerned that the authorities have not allocated the necessary resources because they do not consider that the national preventive mechanism needs additional support in order to carry out its mandate effectively. The Subcommittee does not agree with such an assessment. For example, the mechanism was not able to access the necessary medical expertise when visiting Athalassa mental health hospital, which impeded its work. 94. The Subcommittee reminds the State party that, in order for national preventive mechanisms to fulfil their mandates effectively, they should have a separate secretariat and their own staff and should be able to make recourse to 3 14 Available from www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/Documents.aspx.