CCPR/C/119/D/2681/2015 received in facilities and conditions adapted to the age of the children; and that, if such assurances were not made, Switzerland would be violating article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by transferring them there. The authors argue that, in the light of that finding, the harsh conditions faced by asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection returning to Italy would also fall within the scope of article 3 of the Convention and article 7 of the Covenant. They therefore reiterate that their deportation to Italy would amount to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. They further submit that the decision in Tarakhel v. Switzerland indicates that individual guarantees, such as ensuring that children who are returned do not face destitution or harsh accommodation conditions, are necessary. State party’s observations 4.1 On 18 May 2016, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication. The State party describes the structure, composition and functioning of the Refugees Appeals Board, as well as the legislation applying to cases related to the Dublin Regulation.11 4.2 With regard to the admissibility and merits of the communication, the State party argues that the authors have failed to establish a prima facie case for the purpose of admissibility under article 7 of the Covenant. In particular, it has not been established that there are substantial grounds for believing that the authors and their children will be in danger of being subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Italy. The communication is therefore manifestly unfounded and should be declared inadmissible. It follows from the Committee’s jurisprudence that States parties are under an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory where the necessary and foreseeable consequence of the deportation would be a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by article 7 of the Covenant, whether in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists.12 4.3 The State party notes that the authors have not provided any essential new information or views on their circumstances beyond the information already relied upon during the asylum proceedings, and the Refugees Appeals Board had already considered that information in its decision of 25 February 2014. The State party submits that the Committee cannot be an appellate body that reassesses the factual circumstances advocated by the authors in their asylum application before the Danish authorities and it must give considerable weight to the findings of fact made by the Refugees Appeals Board, which is better placed to assess the factual circumstances of the authors’ case. Furthermore, the State party makes reference to the Committee’s jurisprudence, according to which “it is generally for the organs of State parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case, unless it can be established that such an assessment was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice”.13 11 12 13 6 See communication No. 2379/2014, Obah Hussein Ahmed v. Denmark, Views adopted on 8 July 2016, paras. 4.1-4.3. The State party refers to communication No. 2007/2010, J.J.M. v Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 9.2. The State party refers to communications No. 2426/2014, N. V. Denmark, Views adopted on 23 July 2015, para. 6.6; No. 2272/2013, P.T v. Denmark, Views adopted on 1 April 2015, para. 7.3; No. 2393/2014, K v. Denmark, Views adopted on 16 July 2015, paras. 7.4 and 7.5; No. 2186/2012,