CCPR/C/130/D/3042/2017 Annex II Individual opinion of Committee member Andreas Zimmermann (dissenting) 1. This dissenting opinion has to be read in conjunction with my separate opinion in the parallel case against Malta involving the same facts.1 The contents of said separate opinion are therefore to be considered incorporated hereinafter unless otherwise stated. At the outset it must be reiterated, however, that the mere fact that a person did find himself or herself in a search and rescue zone administered by a given State party of the Covenant does not bring that person within the jurisdiction of such State party for purposes of article 2 (1) of the Covenant. This result must then a fortiori be reached even in the absence of such a legal bond which, in the perspective of the majority, had triggered the applicability of the Covenant visà-vis Malta at the first place. 2. It is my clear understanding that Italy, by refusing to have its naval ship – the ITS Libra – undertake a rescue operation to save the lives of the persons in distress at sea, was violating its obligations under applicable rules of the law of the sea. Yet, this was not the question that was before the Committee, nor what the Committee had to decide. Nor indeed could the Committee have decided that very issue. Contrary to what the majority seems to at least imply, it is of even less legal relevance for purposes of article 2 (1) of the Covenant whether Italy is exercising criminal jurisdiction on the basis of the Italian nationality of the naval officers on board the ITS Libra or any other Italian officials. 3. Adding to the problematique of the majority decision is the fact that the majority also finds in the case against Italy that the authors were concurrently subject to the jurisdiction of Malta, despite having found the complaint against Malta inadmissible. At the same time, Italy is now required to provide full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, despite the fact that another State may have caused the tragic loss of lives and despite the fact that, as the majority also finds, the principal responsibility for the rescue operation – and hence, in the majority’s view, also the violation of the rights protected by the Covenant – fell on Malta rather than Italy. Apart from that, the determination as to the obligation of Italy to pay compensation further leaves open the difficult issue of which form of responsibility is incurred by each State, if any – i.e., whether it is proportionate liability only or rather joint and several liability. 4. Finally, the Committee attempts to limit its findings when stating that in the particular circumstances of the case, a special relationship of dependency had been established between the individuals on the vessel in distress and Italy (para. 7.8), which then triggered, in the majority’s view, the applicability of the Covenant. It is safe to assume, however, that the outcomes of both the Maltese and the Italian case, when read together, will be perceived as providing for a general applicability of the Covenant with regard to persons that find themselves in distress at sea either in the search and rescue zone of a State party or close to a ship flying the flag of a State party. This might, as I have already mentioned, eventually have the very unfortunate effect of States parties of the Covenant no longer being willing to undertake such obligations, or rather even trying to avoid coming into close contact with boats in distress so as to avoid any impressions of a “special relationship of dependency” having been created. 1 A.S. et al. v. Malta (CCPR/C/128/D/3043/2017). 13