CCPR/C/130/D/3042/2017 responsible de jure or de facto for the overall conduct of the operation, we do not consider it appropriate to hold Italy accountable under the Covenant for failing to deploy more quickly Italian vessels that would enable it to assume earlier de facto responsibility over the search and rescue operation. 6. We further consider that the approach taken by the majority of equating the ability to engage in a maritime operation in search and rescue areas for which another State is internationally responsible with the notion of jurisdiction over the individuals on vessels in distress might disrupt the legal order that the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, attempted to introduce, with a view to minimizing the “tragedy of the global commons”, generated by the lack of a clear division of labour between coastal States over search and rescue operations. Therefore, while the approach taken by the majority could be suitable to govern the obligations of States in areas for which no State is internationally responsible for search and rescue operations, so as to avoid “negative” jurisdictional conflicts, it is inappropriate for areas where such a responsible State is available and is in fact assuming its responsibilities, and which might generate “positive” jurisdictional conflicts. 7. As a result, we are of the view that given the primary responsibility of Malta for the search and rescue operations in the relevant maritime area and the mere supportive role of the State party, the Committee should not have concluded that the victims on board the capsized vessel fell under the jurisdiction of Italy for the purposes of the Covenant and the Optional Protocol, neither before or at the time at which the vessel capsized, and that the Committee should have therefore considered the communication to be inadmissible pursuant to article 1 of the Optional Protocol. 12