CCPR/C/112/D/2325/2013 December 2006 on the organization of the judiciary. The judgement cannot legally be used to lodge an appeal on points of law and the author criticizes the State party for having sought to ensure that the Supreme Court dismiss the appeal. The author further notes that the Court of Appeal had dismissed his appeal in public session by declaring itself not competent, which is contrary to articles 586 and 587 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and constitutes a miscarriage of justice, on the grounds that the written ruling fails to mention the Court’s competence. The author contends that these inconsistencies clearly result from the State party’s attempts, as part of the campaign of criminal persecution against him, to cover up the misconduct of the judiciary and mislead the Committee. 5.4 Concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author is surprised at the State party’s silence regarding the lack of follow-up given to the legal remedies sought before all the administrative and judicial authorities, and maintains that he availed himself of all effective and available domestic remedies. He further cites the various forms of correspondence sent by his lawyer in respect of his illegal detention and state of health. 5.5 The author further contends that habeas corpus is the only procedure provided for under Cameroonian law, in accordance with article 584 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby petitions on grounds of illegal arrest, detention or failure to observe the formalities prescribed by law can be heard. He submits that contrary to release on bail, which is optional, immediate release should be mandatory in cases of human rights violations by the judicial authorities. The author contests the State party’s strict interpretation of arbitrary detention, which includes other violations of the law such as unforeseeable, inappropriate or unfair detention. 5.6 The author further notes that the Court of Appeal mentions in its ruling that its rulings are final, and does not indicate any other remedy available to the parties. He reiterates that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for further appeals against Court of Appeal rulings in respect of habeas corpus petitions and that, consequently, the Court of Appeal is the highest court in such cases. The author further notes that no appeal on points of law has ever been brought against Court of Appeal rulings involving habeas corpus. He considers that the law does not provide for the referral of cases to the Supreme Court as a court of cassation since it does not establish a legal time limit within which the Court must rule on applications for immediate release, which is inconsistent with the urgent nature of such requests and should be recognized as a legal failing. In the absence of a clearly defined time limit, as for example in the case of tribunaux de grande instance (courts of major jurisdiction), the author submits that cassation is not an effective remedy in this regard. He contends that the State party’s response is inaccurate insofar as it refers to supposedly similar cases in which the Supreme Court was effective, but which did not involve arbitrary detention. According to the author, the State party admits in its submission that no special procedure before the Supreme Court is provided for in habeas corpus cases. The author recalls that he contends, as a subsidiary argument, that if the Supreme Court is a court of appeal, the steps taken by the State party to obstruct the drafting of the ruling and the exceptionally long delays have rendered this remedy inaccessible. 5.7 The author considers that his requests for release on bail were not an effective remedy within the meaning of the Covenant and that the arbitrariness of the judicial authorities rendered his requests ineffective. Except for the initial request made in June 2013, which was granted in such a perverse manner as to amount to a refusal, all of his requests were deliberately ignored by the State party. The author emphasizes that the approval of his release on 14 August 2013 was calculated, as a second detention order had just been issued by a different judge in another case and that, consequently, posting bail would not have changed the situation, contrary to what the State party claims. Regarding the bail, it would have sufficed to accept the partnership agreement between the State party and Hope Group, of which the author is the legal representative, as collateral. The author 12 GE.14-23228 (E)