the child is disabled.59 A beneficiary received the pension in the proportion determined by the law, even if there were no other beneficiaries in the family. By the same token, if the amount required by the number of beneficiaries exceeded the reference amount, each one of them still received the percentage established by the law. In Morocco, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission opted for apportioning explicitly to protect the interests of women. Spouses will receive 40 per cent of the awards, in contrast to the 8 per cent for female spouses in local inheritance law, which in accordance with tradition favours sons. Apportioning is worth considering particularly if there are patterns of unequal treatment that affect family relations as well. Women, in particular, stand to gain from this practice. E. Financing reparations Low socio-economic development, on the one hand, and a large universe of potential beneficiaries, on the other, constrain a Government’s ability to implement a reparations plan. In the Americas, for example, Guatemala, El Salvador and Haiti have not implemented reparations plans, whereas Chile, Argentina and Brazil have. However, the correlation between socio-economic development and reparations is more complex than this factual observation suggests. First, while minimum economic development seems to be a precondition for implementing reparations, countries in comparable economic situations often take quite different paths, as shown most clearly in Chile and Argentina. Second, and perhaps more importantly, in the countries mentioned earlier that have not implemented reparations plans, the political constraints were perhaps as significant as the economic ones. An analysis of failed efforts clearly shows that, normally, without strong and broad coalitions in favour of reparations, no plans, or at best very modest plans, are implemented, even if the country can afford one or can afford a better one.60 Broadly speaking, there are two main models for the financing of reparations: creating special trust funds or introducing a dedicated line in the yearly national budget. Countries that have experimented with the first model have, so far, fared significantly worse than countries that have used the second. This may have to do with political commitment. Nothing illustrates commitment more clearly than the willingness to create a dedicated budget line. The expectation underlying the creation of trust funds that it will be possible to find alternative sources of funding for reparations may demonstrate weak political commitment or actually weaken the resolve that exists—emphasizing yet again that although socio-economic development is important, so are political factors. Nonetheless, there is, in principle, no reason why creative funding efforts must all fail. Some possibilities are: 59 60 See the web page of the Human Rights Programme of the Ministry of the Interior: www.ddhh.gov.cl. See Alexander Segovia, “Financing reparations programs: reflections from international experience”, in The Handbook…. 32