CCPR/C/121/D/2610/2015 recalls its jurisprudence, according to which, while the Spanish version of article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol can result in this paragraph being interpreted differently from the other language versions, this difference must be resolved in accordance with article 33 (4) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by adopting the meaning which best reconciles the authentic texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty. The phrase ha sido sometido in the Spanish version should therefore be interpreted in the light of the other versions as meaning “is being examined” under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. The Committee considers that this interpretation reconciles the meaning of article 5 (2) (a) of the authentic texts referred to in article 14 (1) of the Optional Protocol.9 In the light of the fact that the matter is no longer pending before the regional bodies referred to above, the Committee finds that there is no obstacle to the admissibility of the communication under article 5 (2) (a). The Committee notes, however, that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Court of Human Rights thoroughly reviewed essentially the same claims made by the author against the State party and issued fully reasoned decisions on them, which deserve due weight. 8.4 The Committee takes note of the author’s claims that she and her son were not provided with protective measures after the attack, that the measures ordered by the Third Court of First Instance of the State of Miranda were never implemented and that she was not afforded any protection beyond the court ruling. The Committee further notes that the State party, although providing explanations regarding the protective measures afforded to the author and her son throughout the years following the murder of her husband (paras. 6.4−6.6), has not specified which concrete measures were taken by the police to grant protection to them. The Committee considers, however, that the information provided by the author is not sufficiently precise as to the nature of the risk posed to her after leaving the border area of Zulia and therefore does not permit the Committee to assess the existence of State responsibility under the Covenant in this regard. The Committee therefore finds that these claims have not been sufficiently substantiated and are inadmissible pursuant to article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 8.5 With regard to the author’s claim under article 14 pertaining to the conduct of investigation, the Committee notes that the author has already alleged a violation of her rights and those of her husband and son under articles 6 and 7, read in conjunction with article 2 (3), of the Covenant with relation to the same issues. In these circumstances, the Committee does not consider that examination of whether the State party also violated its obligations under article 14 to be distinct from examination of the violation of her rights and those of her husband and son under articles 6 and 7, read in conjunction with article 2 (3). The Committee therefore considers that the author’s claims under article 14 are incompatible with article 2 of the Covenant, and inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 8.6 The Committee notes the author’s claim that she was not able to exhaust domestic remedies due to the fact that they had proved to be unreasonably lengthy. It also notes that the State party has not challenged the admissibility of the communication on the grounds of a failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 8.7 The Committee considers that the remainder of the author’s allegations have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. As no other obstacles to admissibility exist, the Committee declares the communication admissible as raising issues under article 9 (1) and articles 6 (1) and 7, in connection with 2 (3) of the Covenant, and proceeds to its examination of the merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, as required by article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 9.2 The Committee notes that the author’s complaints concerning the violation of her rights and those of her husband and son relate to the following factors: (a) the State’s 9 10 Semey v. Spain, para. 8.3; and Rodríguez Castañeda v. México, para. 6.3.