informed thereof, whereas these proceedings would subsequently mean, in any scenario where withdrawal of the obligation to receive treatment were sought, stricter procedures that those provided for under ordinary law. In other terms, the discrimination thus introduced was not sufficiently justified in the Act. The second provision concerns another discrimination resulting from the Act with regard to the discharge of orders for treatment without consent concerning persons judged not to be criminally responsible or having spent time in units for difficult psychiatric patients (UMDs). This discrimination was judged unconstitutional, in the absence of adequate details on the patients placed in UMDs. In a parenthetical clause whose practical impact is far from negligible, the Council pointed out that hospitalisation in a unit for difficult psychiatric patients “is imposed without sufficient legal guarantees”. In other words, when patients are placed in UMDs in an expeditious manner, without precise grounds being required, discriminatory treatment cannot then be based solely on the fact of such placement. The authorities are therefore going to have to rapidly elaborate a procedure for admission to UMDs which is far more rigorous than that which currently exists. Finally, the third provision defines the legal reality of the treatment programme that the Act of 5th July 2011 aimed to implement. Part of this treatment programme may take place in an institution, with the remainder being carried out in appropriate establishments or at home. The question of whether constraint was inherent to such programmes was posed. For example, can constraint be exercised outside of hospital, including at home, in order to ensure that patients are obliged to follow their treatment in practice? This is not a theoretical question: doctors sometimes resort to this approach. The Council very clearly pointed out that the provisions of the law “do not authorise the enforcement of such an obligation [to receive treatment] under constraint” and that “treatment cannot be administered to the [the patients concerned] in a coercive manner, nor can they be lead or maintained by force in order to complete stays in institutions provided for by the treatment programme”. In other words, only full hospitalisation makes constraint permissible. While the verdict is satisfying in its precision, it weakens the scope of the “compulsory treatment programme” intended as an alternative to hospitalisation, with regard to the scope of which ambiguity had until then been maintained. In any case, the ruling by the Constitutional Council obliges the authorities to review the Act of 5th July, before the date fixed by the constitutional judge at 1st of October 2013. This new deadline raises the question of whether, rather than being used solely for the preparation of amendments to procedures for treatment without consent, the intervening period should not also be used for the elaboration of a “major law” on psychiatry called for by many professionals. However, it is not certain that consensus reigns among the latter with regard to the measures to be introduced. 2.5.1.2 Implementation of the Act In the second place, the implementation of the Act of 5 th July 2011 poses a set of questions with regard to the role of the liberty and custody judge, which may be summarised in three separate questions. Firstly, a certain number of doctors still consider this judicial intervention to be either “unjustified”, superfluous or counterproductive and are, in short, against the principle of patients appearing before the judge. As we know, the law provides the possibility of the doctor responsible certifying that the patient’s condition makes it impossible for them to appear in court146: in such cases, they are represented by a lawyer. In certain institutions, the doctors draw 146 Article L. 3211-12-2 of the public health code (code de la santé publique), second paragraph. 65