A/HRC/37/50/Add.1 34. The Special Rapporteur appreciates the clarifications made by the Government in relation to the practices, in its press release of 17 December 2016, 8 and recognizes that there may be situations when such searches are required. However, given that any such search creates an inherently delicate situation marked by a significant risk of abuse, body searches should be avoided and, to the extent possible, less intrusive measures for detecting the entry of illegal objects should be used. Whenever body searches are unavoidable, authorities must be particularly careful to ensure that they are conducted in a respectful manner, consistent with the person’s human dignity, with the right to privacy, and with the absolute prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. C. Conditions of detention 1. Overview 35. At the time of the visit, Turkey was reported to have 373 penitentiaries and detention facilities 9 with an approximate capacity of 180,000 inmates, 10 1,264 police stations with 1,197 lock-ups, 2,012 custodial areas in the internal security units of the gendarmerie, and 303 lock-ups under 81 provincial public security branch offices, with a total of 52,000 guards.11 36. The attempted coup and the subsequent mass arrests reportedly led to an influx of 42,083 detainees12 into the detention system, taking the prison population in Turkey up to 203,255 (which is ordinarily around 150,000, including 51,000 persons detained for terrorism-related offences and 2,255 persons detained in connection with organized crime).13 By a decree of 17 August 2016, approximately 44,000 inmates were released to accommodate the new arrivals. Nevertheless, the massive influx of detainees led to overcrowding in many facilities and significantly increased the proportion of pretrial detainees. The Special Rapporteur took note of the latest figures provided by the Ministry of Justice in June 2017 indicating that Turkish prisons were holding more than 224,878 individuals, which further compounded the risk of overcrowding. 14 37. In the course of his visit, the Special Rapporteur visited the Sincan prison complex in Ankara, including its F-type high security section and its female detention facilities, the D-type high-security and E-type closed prisons in Diyarbakır, including the male, female and juvenile sections, the counter-terrorism police holding cells in Şanlıurfa, two police stations in Esenler, Istanbul, and the closed No. 9 prison in the Silivri Penitentiaries Campus in Istanbul. 38. In general, the facilities visited were purpose-built detention centres, and in terms of infrastructure were adequately equipped. Overall, conditions of detention were found to be satisfactory or, at least, acceptable in the circumstances, save for the particular problems observed under the headings below. 2. Overcrowding 39. All the facilities visited, except the Silivri Penitentiaries Campus in Istanbul, were significantly overcrowded, with occupancy ranging from 125 per cent to more than 200 per 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 8 Press release on the preliminary observations of the Special Rapporteur, available at www.judiciaryofturkey.gov.tr/Press-Release-on-the-Preliminary-Observations-of-Nils-MELZER-theUN-Special-Rapporteur-on-Torture. Figure as per the Special Rapporteur’s meeting with a representative of the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses on 28 November 2016. Figure as at 18 February 2016, provided by the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses. Figures as per the Special Rapporteur’s meeting with a representative of the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses on 28 November 2016. Figure as at 4 January 2017, provided by the Ministry of Justice to the Parliamentary Coup Investigation Commission. Figures as per the Special Rapporteur’s meeting with a representative of the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses on 28 November 2016. See www.cte.adalet.gov.tr.