CAT/C/62/D/695/2015 same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.2 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the complaint should be declared inadmissible under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention on the grounds that the complainant has failed to exhaust all domestic remedies. It recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, it shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. That rule does not apply where it has been established that the application of said remedies has been unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief. 11 6.3 The Committee notes that, according to the information submitted by the parties, the complainant filed two humanitarian and compassionate applications, on 8 August 2016 and 10 July 2017, and that at least the latter one is still pending. However, in any event, the Committee considers that the humanitarian and compassionate application is not an effective remedy for the purposes of admissibility pursuant to article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, given its discretionary and non-judicial nature and the fact that it does not stay the removal of a complainant.12 6.4 The Committee also notes the State party’s observations that, when the applicant has already had his or her claim determined by the Refugee Protection Division, the preremoval risk assessment — as in the complainant’s case — is based largely on any new facts or evidence13 that may demonstrate that the person is at risk of persecution, torture, risk to life or risk of cruel or unusual treatment or punishment; that the pre-removal risk assessment application stays the removal; and that, in the event of a negative decision of the assessment, the person can apply for judicial review to the Federal Court. The State party further maintains that the complainant’s application for a pre-removal risk assessment was dismissed by the assessment officer on 8 June 2017 and that, although the assessment decision may be subject to judicial review by the Federal Court with leave and a judicial stay of removal pending the final decision may also be available, the complainant has failed to apply for leave to seek judicial review. 6.5 In the present case, the Committee observes that, in his pre-removal risk assessment application, the complainant submitted new evidence that had not been considered previously by the Refugee Protection Division and the Federal Court within the asylum proceedings. The assessment officer took that new evidence into account and assessed it, together with information about the human rights situation in India (see para. 6.2 above). Nevertheless, the assessment officer concluded that the complainant had not rendered it probably that he would be at personal risk to life or of cruel and inhuman treatment if returned to India. The Committee further observes that, according to section 18.1 (4) of the Federal Courts Act, a judicial review of a pre-removal risk assessment decision by the Federal Court is not limited to errors of law and mere procedural flaws, and that the Court may look at the substance of a case. The Committee also observes that the complainant has not put forward arguments substantiating his allegation that that judicial review of the assessment decision is not an effective remedy. He merely argues that the procedure is very expensive and ineffective since there is a low chance of success. In that regard, the Committee considers that the mere doubt about the effectiveness of a remedy does not dispense a complainant with the obligation to exhaust it. The Committee therefore concludes that the complainant has failed to advance sufficient elements that would show that the judicial review of the pre-removal risk assessment would be ineffective in his case. Furthermore, the Committee notes that the information provided by the parties does not indicate that the complainant had been represented by a State-appointed lawyer, and recalls its jurisprudence that errors made by a privately retained lawyer cannot normally be attributed to the State party.14 11 12 13 14 8 See, inter alia, E.Y. v. Canada (CAT/C/43/D/307/2006), para. 9.2. See J.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/60/D/699/2015), para. 6.2; A v. Canada (CAT/C/57/D/583/2014), para. 6.2; and 520/2012, W.G.D. v. Canada (CAT/C/53/D/520/2012), para. 7.4. See section 113 (a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. See R.S.A.N. v. Canada (CAT/C/37/D/284/2006), para. 6.4.