CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 protecting women from discrimination in providing legal termination of pregnancy violates articles 2 (c), 5 and 12 of the Convention and general recommendation No. 24. Also, the failure by the State to adopt legislative, administrative and judicial measures that protect, guarantee and ensure the right of access to health under conditions of equality in the context of therapeutic abortion violates articles 2 (f), 3, 5, 12 and 16 (e) of the Convention. The absence of such measures resulted in absolute discretion, allowing health professionals to deny timely medical services to L.C. in a disproportionate and illegal manner. 3.4 According to the author, the facts as described also violate other fundamental rights, such as the right to life, dignity and freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in the context of access to medical services without discrimination. She states that the interference of the doctors in L.C.’s decision to terminate her pregnancy shattered her life prospects. The process of requesting an abortion constituted a discretionary and arbitrary barrier to access to a legal service, which had irreparable consequences for her life and health and in turn constituted suffering equivalent to torture. Forcing her to continue the pregnancy also constituted cruel and inhuman treatment and therefore a violation of her right to physical, psychological and moral integrity. Furthermore, the harm is of continuing duration, since it has repercussions in the form of her daily situation of disability, dependency and paralysis. 3.5 According to the author, the foregoing violations are aggravated by the fact that L.C. was a minor. The health-care professionals did not provide the special attention required by her status as an adolescent female, and furthermore, as a person of limited economic resources. 3.6 The author requested that the Committee declare the violation of the author’s rights under the Convention and request the State party to adopt measures of reparation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. The Committee should also urge the State party to adopt and implement legislative, administrative and judicial measures necessary to protect the right of women to sexual and reproductive health without discrimination. State party’s observations on admissibility 4.1 In a submission of 18 September 2009, the State party maintained that the communication should be considered inadmissible under article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol on the grounds of failure to exhaust all available domestic remedies. 4.2 The State party notes that the alleged victim could have filed a petition for amparo with the Constitutional Court. The author’s questioning of the effectiveness of that recourse is based on a prediction of future success, since she argues that the time frame for receiving a final decision varies between 62 and 102 days (according to the calculations she makes motu proprio, based on the rules of procedure of the Code of Constitutional Procedure). However, the author does not take into account that, although there are first and second instances before the case can be submitted to the Constitutional Court, if the case is decided in those instances in favour of the applicant, that decision is final. Consequently, an application for amparo can be finalized by a ruling of the judge of first instance. Furthermore, in accordance with article 53 of the Code of Constitutional Procedure, the decision must be issued at the same hearing, or in exceptional cases, within not more than five days after the hearing has been completed. If a decision is appealed, the decision on the appeal must be issued within five days after the case is heard. 4.3 The State party also invokes article 46 of the Code of Constitutional Procedure, under which exceptions are made to the exhaustion of remedies before petitioning for amparo. Such exceptions are made when the exhaustion of remedies might render the harm irreparable, if there are no regulations governing prior remedies, or if the application has been initiated unnecessarily by the victim. Article 45 furthermore states that, in the event of 6