Alternatives to detention for asylum seekers and people in return procedures alternative was available. The Court thus finds that the French system did not sufficiently protect their right to liberty. Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi Karim, C-61/11 PPU, 28 April 2011 39. In that regard, it follows from recital 16 in the preamble to that directive [Return Directive 2008/115/EC] and from the wording of Article 15(1) that the Member States must carry out the removal using the least coercive measures possible. It is only where, in the light of an assessment of each specific situation, the enforcement of the return decision in the form of removal risks being compromised by the conduct of the person concerned that the Member States may deprive that person of his liberty and detain him. Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi, C-146/14 PPU, 5 June 2014 64. Consequently, the answer to question 1(b) and (c) is that Article 15(3) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 [Return Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the ‘supervision’ that has to be undertaken by a judicial authority dealing with an application for extension of the detention of a third-country national must permit that authority to decide, on a case-by-case basis, on the merits of whether the detention of the third-country national concerned should be extended, whether detention may be replaced with a less coercive measure or whether the person concerned should be released, that authority thus having power to take into account the facts stated and evidence adduced by the administrative authority which has brought the matter before it, as well as any facts, evidence and observations which may be submitted to the judicial authority in the course of the proceedings. United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) A. v. Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, HRC, 3 April 1997 9.2 On the first question, the Committee recalls that the notion of “arbitrariness” must not be equated with “against the law” but be interpreted more broadly to include such elements as inappropriateness and injustice. Furthermore, remand in custody could be considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the circumstances of the case, for example to prevent flight or interference with evidence: the element of proportionality becomes relevant in this context. […] C. v. Australia, CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, HRC, 13 November 2002 8.2 […] In the present case, the author’s detention as a non-citizen without an entry permit continued, in mandatory terms, until he was removed or granted a permit. While the State party advances particular reasons to justify the individual detention (para. 4.28 et seq.), the Committee observes that the State party has failed to demonstrate that those reasons justify the author’s continued detention in the light of the passage of time and intervening circumstances. In particular, the State party has not demonstrated that, in the light of the author’s particular circumstances, there were not less invasive means of achieving the same ends, that is to say, compliance with the State party’s immigration policies, by, for example, the imposition of reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions which would take account of the author’s deteriorating condition. In these circumstances, whatever the reasons for the original detention, continuance of immigration detention for over two years without individual justification and without any chance of substantive judicial 17