CEDAW/C/59/D/49/2013 compassionate grounds in February 2000, but had not made a second such application since her arrival in Canada in 2009, although there was no legal obstacle preventing her from applying afresh on the basis of her new factual situation. The State party explains that, following legislative changes to the refugee sy stem in 2010, applications on humanitarian and compassionate grounds are no longer based on an assessment of risks, but on the hardship potentially faced by applicants in their country of origin. 5 The State party therefore submits that, although a pending application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds would not prevent her removal, the author did have further domestic remedies available to her, which she did not pursue. 4.7 In addition, according to the State party, the Convention does not contain a n implicit obligation of non-refoulement, unlike article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment or articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Articles 1 to 3 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women therefore do not include a guarantee not to be returned to a country where there is a risk that a person would face gender-based violence. The State party disputes that the Committee ever took such a view in previous jurisprudence, including in N.S.F. v. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland , in which the Committee considered the communication to be inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies and did not comment on whether the non-refoulement principle was protected by the Convention. The State party also submits that a good faith interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the text of the Convention, in the light of its object and purpose, does not support such an implicit obligation and refers to the travaux préparatoires in suggesting that the negotiating parties never contemplated or intended to include such an obligation. The State party submits that the Committee should therefore not seek to extend the interpretation of the Convention to include a guarantee of non-refoulement. 4.8 The State party further recalls that it is within their sovereignty for States to determine the conditions of entry and stay of foreigners on their territories, including the modalities of their removal, and that only the most serious breaches of fundamental rights can constitute exceptions, such as in cases of irreparable and grave prejudice to the individual being returned. The State party observes that the Human Rights Committee has been cautious in accepting an implicit obligation on States parties not to return individuals and that the Committee should adopt a similarly cautious approach. The State party submits that the author’s communication is therefore incompatible with the provisions of the Convention. 4.9 The State party adds that the author’s communication rests mainly on her disagreement with the assessment and findings of the pre-removal risk assessment officer in rejecting her application, in particular regardi ng the existence of an internal flight alternative. The State party considers that merely expressing such disagreement is not sufficient for the author to substantiate her allegations that articles 1 to 3 of the Convention have been violated. The State par ty recalls that it is not the role of the Committee to re-evaluate facts and evidence unless it is manifest that the evaluation conducted by the national authorities was arbitrary or amounted __________________ 5 6/14 The State party states that some examples of such hardship include the lack of critical medical or health care, discrimination that does not amount to persecution and adverse country conditions that have a direct negative impact on the applicant. 14-67406