CEDAW/C/59/D/49/2013 such an obligation, at least for the purposes of admissibility, in its decision in N.S.F. v. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelan d. According to the author’s interpretation of that case, the Committee did not consider the allegation based on the risk of gender-based violence upon deportation to Pakistan as a ground of inadmissibility. 5.2 The author asserts that, contrary to the State party’s contentions, the harm that she would face if returned to Mexico amounts to a threat to life and that the physical abuse that she has suffered constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, which has been recognized by the Committee in its general recommendation No. 19 as discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. The author further disputes that treaty bodies have obligations limited to “only the most serious breaches of fundamental rights” in the context of remova l to third parties. She observes that the Human Rights Committee has found, in cases of deportation, that States parties have obligations beyond those set forth in articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, given that it has previously found violations of articles 17 (1) (unlawful or arbitrary interference with family), 23 (protection of the family unit) and 24 (1) (protection of minors) of the Covenant. 7 5.3 Concerning the State party’s contention that it is not the role of the Committee to review the evaluation of facts and evidence by the national authorities, the author submits that she suffered a denial of justice in the decision -making process because her claim was credible, that the evidence that she submitted was n ot taken into account and that she should not be deported. 5.4 The author claims that the State party has violated article 2 of the Convention, but indicates that she was not treated in a discriminatory manner by the authorities in the processing of her asylum claim. She does not allege the commission of any act of gender-based discrimination by the authorities of the State party during the immigration proceedings or within the immigration system, indicating that her complaint to the Committee relates only to the risk that she would face if returned to Mexico. 5.5 With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author argues that an application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds is not an effective remedy, given that it would not suspend her removal from the State party and the relevant officers would no longer be able to consider alleged risks pertaining to persecution, torture or cruel treatment. She also recalls the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture, wh ich has established that an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds is based on purely humanitarian criteria, is ex gratia in nature and is not a remedy that must be exhausted to satisfy the necessary requirements. 8 State party’s additional observations on admissibility 6.1 On 8 October 2013, the State party made further submissions on inadmissibility, while reiterating its initial grounds for considering the communication inadmissible. __________________ 7 8 8/14 See communication No. 1011/2001, Madafferi v. Australia, views adopted on 26 July 2004, and communication No. 930/2000, Winata v. Australia, views adopted on 26 July 2001. See communication No. 133/1999, Falcon Ríos v. Canada, decision adopted on 23 November 2004, para. 7.3. 14-67406