Criminal detention and alternatives: fundamental rights aspects in EU cross-border transfers How many transfers potentially? An example from a Member State In 2015, Sweden reported transferring 65 prisoners (in part while the relevant instruments were being implemented in the country). These included 15 transferred to the Netherlands, 14 to Finland, seven to both Denmark and Poland, six to Lithuania, and four to Germany. Reasons for not implementing transfer decisions included, in particular, a lack of consent from receiving states (which is expected to be less problematic with the EU legislation), as well as long processing times in receiving states, so that too little time of the sentences remained to be served. Sweden is seeing smaller numbers of ‘foreign’ sentences being served in the country – for example, 10 from Denmark and about 10 from other EU Member States in 2015. Source: Sweden (2016), Kriminalvården, Annual Report 2015 (Årsredovisning 2015), pp. 28 and 97 Radicalisation in prison Concerns about detention include concerns relating to radicalisation. Factors driving radicalisation include human rights violations and marginalisation.139 Detention conditions and activities during detention to reduce exclusion and enhance reintegration into society upon release are essential aspects in this regard. Radicalisation in prisons has become an increasing threat throughout the world, including in the EU. People accused of, or sentenced for, terrorist charges are imprisoned throughout Europe and radicalisation in prisons has become a serious concern to EU Member States. Radicalisation is defined as “a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. The reasons behind this process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic or personal.”140 Detainees, particularly posttrial detainees, are commonly seen as at risk of becoming radicalised. The European Parliament has identified prisons as “breeding ground[s] for the spread of radical and violent ideologies and terrorist radicalisation” and called on the Commission to establish and implement EU strategies for combating radicalisation.141 Additionally, EU counter-terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove promotes “a rehabilitation programme as an alternative to prosecution […] with equivalent programmes for people that are already in prison”.142 139 OSCE ODIHR (2014), p. 36. 140 Council of Europe (2016b), para. 1. 141 European Parliament (2015a), Resolution on the Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations, P8_TA-PROV(2015) 0410, 25 November 2015, Section I (4), II (10), (12) and (13). 142 European Parliament (2015b). 58 In some Member States, accused or convicted terrorists are held together with the general prison population and no special regulations apply to them. This promotes contact with inmates holding different socio-cultural and religious beliefs – which can have a positive effect on the perspective of a presumed terrorist – but also bears the risk of creating contact between like-minded people and other criminal networks that might lead to future collaboration.143 For example, ETA prisoners are scattered around high security prisons in Spain and France to keep them separated from each other. (Since the ETA ceasefire in 2011, requests for prisoner transfers to the Basque country – where they would be closer to family, which would contribute to social rehabilitation – are becoming more frequent.)144 In these types of facilities, prison staff do not receive special training on how to identify radicalisation or people who are at risk. By contrast, some prison facilities in some Member States have separate terrorist wings. Individuals are believed to be more easily monitored and observed for any radical behaviour within these wings, and do not have opportunities to radicalise other inmates. The guards are usually specially trained to work with suspected or convicted terrorists. The limited contact prisoners have with other people might be counterproductive in terms of their social rehabilitation and their lives after being imprisoned. The Netherlands has special terrorist units in two prisons145 and has been criticised for its isolation policies by the UN monitoring body.146 Prison can also be a place for de-radicalisation. In January 2016, France started a programme to de-radicalise individuals in prisons. Terrorists are being held away from other prisoners, and they can receive study sessions if wanted, have interfaith encounters organised and family ties reconstructed. In addition, stronger surveillance and monitoring, as well as specific preventive efforts, are applied – this includes, for example, hiring Muslim chaplains and special training for prison guards.147 Another example can be found in Denmark, where the ‘Back on track’ (BOT) project focuses on prisoners who are sentenced for terrorism offences. As part of the project, mentors are trained to work with inmates who have been sentenced for extremist or terrorist crimes. Prisoners who are considered to be at risk 143 Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (2015). 144 Spain, National Press Bulletin (Boletín de Prensa Nacional) (2011); TransConflict (2015); Neumann, P. R. (2010), p. 16; Various demonstrations and organisations, such as the Basque Peace Process. 145 Neumann, P.R. (2010), p. 17; Government of the Netherlands (2015). 146 UN, Committee against Torture (CAT) (2013), Section 74 (26). 147 France, Ministry of Justice (2015a); France, Ministry of Justice (2015b).