CAT/C/61/D/725/2016 for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not, as such, constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. 27 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, the Committee notes that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk. The Committee further recalls that, in accordance with its general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned,28 while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, to assess freely the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 7.4 In assessing the risk of torture in the present case, the Committee notes the complainant’s contention that there was a foreseeable, real and personal risk that he would be tortured if returned to Sri Lanka owing to his imputed links to the Tamil Tigers, born or belonging to a particular social and ethnic group (a Tamil male from an area previously controlled by the Tamil Tigers who has a scar on his leg that could be seen as being a war scar), his fear of harm from the Criminal Investigation Department, the Karuna group (and any men in the white van not associated with that group) and his previous employer, his alleged torture, including sexual torture, by the Criminal Investigation Department during the investigation of the university incident in 2011 and his unlawful departure from Sri Lanka. The Committee also notes the State party’s observation that its domestic authorities found that the complainant lacked credibility owing to inconsistencies in his factual account of events; that the complainant has not provided credible evidence and has failed to substantiate that there was a foreseeable, real and personal risk that he would be subjected to torture by the authorities if returned to Sri Lanka; that his claims have been reviewed by the competent domestic authorities, in accordance with domestic legislation and taking into account the current human rights situation in Sri Lanka; and that the domestic authorities were not convinced that the complainant fell within the category of persons entitled to protection under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 7.5 The Committee notes the State party authorities did not accept that the complainant had been approached by students about the broken windows at the university; that he had been abducted by people in a van warning him to be quiet; and that he had been threatened or harassed by the police or Criminal Investigation Department in relation to the incident as his account was inconsistent and changed a number of times. In that regard, it observes that the complainant was able to remain living around his home area in his country and to continue working in his job at the university as a security guard until shortly before he left Sri Lanka to come to the State party. The Committee notes that the State party authorities did not accept either that his father or other members of the family had been threatened or 27 28 12 See, for example, communications No. 282/2005, S.P.A. v. Canada, decision adopted on 7 November 2006; No. 333/2007, T.I. v. Canada, decision adopted on 15 November 2010; No. 344/2008, A.M.A. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 12 November 2010; No. 550/2013, S.K. and others v. Sweden, decision adopted on 8 May 2015, para. 7.3; and No. 648/2015, S.S. v. Australia, decision adopted on 10 May 2017, para. 10.2. See, for example, communication No. 356/2008, N.S. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 6 May 2010, para. 7.3.