64 themselves decisive. In the absence of other elements, the potential risk could be mitigated through other guarantees. A simple reference to the nature of the crime 216 cannot be considered an adequate rationale for flight risk. Likewise, the gravity of the charges brought against a person cannot be the only element taken into consideration 217 to justify the subsequent protraction of pretrial detention. 155. The Commission has noted that the ordering of pretrial detention on the basis of the seriousness of the offense is not always a matter of legal design. During the Rapporteurship for PDL’s visit to Uruguay, for example, the representatives of the judiciary expressed their firm conviction that the seriousness of the offense itself leads to the assumption that the accused will incur in some form of action justifying the need to order pretrial detention. On account of that situation, the IACHR urged the State, in particular, to promote “a real paradigm shift in thinking about the appropriateness and 218 need for pretrial detention.” 156. In its report Insufficient Judicial Independence, Distorted Pretrial Detention, the Due Process of Law Foundation stated that in some of the region’s countries, the social climate created by the different players in the public debate about citizen security – to which reference has been made in Chapter II of this report – have led not only to changes in legislation, but also to guidelines for judicial interpretation about the admissibility of pretrial detention. The simplest and most common of these guidelines is to reduce the decision on the use of pretrial detention to the severity of the punishment, which in law is normally listed as one of several elements that must necessarily be taken into account. As a result, in many cases, hearings to discuss the admissibility of pretrial detention are turned into “advance trials,” with flight risk being assessed in light of the expected penalty, which constitutes prejudging the guilt of the 219 accused. 157. Finally, regarding the recidivism criterion, the Commission is of the view that it can be considered an additional element in analyzing the applicability of 216 ECHR, Case of Piruzyan v. Armenia (Application No. 33376/07), Judgment of June 26, 2012 (Third Section of the Court), paras. 95 and 96; ECHR, Case of Panchenko v. Russia (Application No. 45100/98), Judgment of February 8, 2006 (Fourth Section of the Court), para. 105; ECHR, Case of Becciev v. Moldova (Application No. 9190/03), Judgment of October 4, 2005 (Fourth Section of the Court), para. 58; ECHR, Case of Muller v. France (Application No. 2180/93), Judgment of March 17, 1997 (Grand Chamber), para. 43; ECHR, Case of Letellier v. France (Application 12369/86), Judgment of June 26, 1991 (Grand Chamber), para. 43. 217 ECHR, Case of Idalov v. Russia (Application No. 5826/03), Judgment of 22 May 2012 (Grand Chamber), para. 145; ECHR, Case of Chraidi v. Germany (Application No. 65655/01), Judgment of October 26, 2006 (Fifth Section of the Court), para. 40; ECHR, Case of Wemhoff v. Germany (Application 2122/64), Judgment of June 27, 1968 (Grand Chamber), As to the Law, para. 14. 218 IACHR, Press Release 76/11 – IACHR Recommends Adoption of a Comprehensive Public Policy on Prisons in Uruguay, Washington, D.C., July 25, 2011, Annex, available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/076A.asp, paras. 42 and 46. 219 DPLF, Insufficient Judicial Independence, Distorted Pretrial Detention – The Cases of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, 2013, pp. 16 and 17. See also: IACHR Regional Meeting of Experts on Pretrial Detention, May 9 and 10, 2013, presentation by Luis Pásara, available in Spanish at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/ppl/actividades/prisionpreventiva.asp.