76 and not to the accused or the defense team, to establish the elements to justify the 269 admissibility of pretrial detention. 187. When it is shown that a detention was arbitrary – for example, because it was ungrounded – it is pointless to examine any other circumstances, such as 270 the duration for which it was ordered, since “arbitrary deprivation of liberty can 271 never be a necessary or proportionate measure.” 188. Regarding the quality of the evidence required to place a person in pretrial detention, the Inter-American Court has ruled that “there must be sufficient evidence to allow reasonable supposition that the person committed to trial has taken part in the criminal offense under investigation.” And, based on the criterion set by the European Court regarding the existence of “reasonable suspicion” grounded on facts or information “which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence,” the Inter-American Court has ruled that such suspicions “must be based on specific facts, expressed in words; that is, not on mere conjectures or 272 abstract intuitions.” 189. Regarding the allowable margins in considering suspicions, the Rapporteur on Torture has stressed that “the exigencies of dealing with terrorist criminal activities cannot justify interpreting the notion of the ‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion on which an arrest and then a detention may be based, to the point of 273 impairing its very meaning.” 190. Similarly, in the case of López Álvarez v. Honduras, the Court ruled that “[t]he judicial authority did not take into account new evidentiary elements that could justify the detention, instead it only considered the same elements that supported the 269 IACHR, Application from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Case 12.554, Francisco Usón Ramírez, July 25, 2008, para. 172. Similarly, ECHR, Case of Aleksanyan v. Russia (Application No. 46468/08), Judgment of December 22, 2008 (First Section of the Court), para. 179; ECHR, Case of Ilijkov v. Bulgaria (Application No. 33977/96), Judgment of July 26, 2001 (Fourth Section of the Court), paras. 84 to 85. 270 I/A Court H.R., Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 142; I/A Court H.R., Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para. 82; I/A Court H.R., Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 120. 271 UN, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Annual Report presented to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/22/44, published December 24, 2012, para. 48. 272 I/A Court H.R., Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, paras. 101-103. In addition to the case of Fox, Campbell and Hartley, referred to by the Inter-American Court in this footnote’s citation, this definition of reasonable suspicion was also followed by the European Court in, for example, ECHR, Case of Grinenko v. Ukraine (Application No. 33627/06), Judgment of November 15, 2012 (Fifth Section of the Court), para. 82, and ECHR, Case of K.-F. v. Germany (Application No. 25629/94), Judgment of November 27, 1997, para. 57. 273 UN, Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Interim Report, A/57/173, published August 2, 2002, para. 21.