49 Local authorities make similar kinds of statements. For example, the Mayor of Guayaquil has been reported as requesting the dismissal of several judges in that city for failing to 163 order pretrial detention. 112. As a further example of this same phenomenon, Chile’s Diego Portales University noted in its most recent Annual Report that: In late 2011, the Minister of Justice […] stated that the work of judges who were “excessively focused on guarantees” (referring to decisions on precautionary measures made by guarantee judges in hearings held in the aftermath of student demonstrations) would not be endorsed and that the executive branch had the power to take such rulings into account in deciding on promotions within the judiciary. Later, the judicial branch published statistical data to refute the ministry’s claims, indicating that 89% of the prosecution service’s requests for 164 pretrial detention had been admitted by the guarantee judges. 113. As for the pressure from the judiciary itself, on occasions, judicial disciplinary oversight agencies are used to punish those judges deemed to have been insufficiently strict in their decisions regarding the liberty of persons facing criminal charges. Although few judges are sanctioned – through either disciplinary or criminal proceedings or impeachments – the existence of pending charges against judges or prosecutors for having failed to order pretrial detention has a chilling effect among judicial officers. For those directly affected, it constitutes a major burden, since they must prepare their own defense, generally from a state of solitude and isolation within the institution. The counterbalance to this is that it is highly unusual for a judge to be punished for having issued a pretrial detention order of questionable legal admissibility or need. In addition to this, senior public officials within judicial agencies acting outside their functions have occasionally been seen to issue systematic opinions in the media regarding specific matters related to the administration of justice. This sets clear guidelines and criteria for lower ranking judges to follow. These elements help create a climate where prosecutors and judges may find that what best serves their own 163 DPLF, Insufficient Judicial Independence, Distorted Pretrial Detention: The Cases of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, 2013, pp. 126, 128, and 131. These Saturday addresses are weekly presentations to the public that President Correa makes to report on different activities. 164 Diego Portales University, Law School Human Rights Center, Annual Report on Human Rights in Chile (Informe Anual sobre Derechos Humanos en Chile) 2012, p. 212. Declarations of this kind, which belong to the trend known as “criminal populism,” are a direct response to authoritarian urges within the societies at which they are directed. In Chile, according to the First Human Rights National Survey, conducted by the INDH in 2001, “58.6% of respondents said they completely agreed with all criminals being incarcerated, irrespective of whatever crime they may have committed,” and “47% of the population said they were in complete disagreement with the notion that only the most serious crimes should be punished by custodial sentences.” National Human Rights Institute (INDH), Human Rights Situation in Chile – Annual Report (Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Chile – Informe Anual) 2011 , p. 21.