56 184 illusory, and this also applies to the right to the presumption of innocence (Art. 8.2). Consequently, respecting and upholding the right to the presumption of innocence has very specific consequences for the way in which the State exercises its punitive power (ius puniendi). 134. In practical terms, upholding the right to the presumption of innocence first implies that, as a general rule, the accused should remain at liberty 185 during criminal proceedings. This means that pretrial detention must be used as a truly exceptional measure and that, in all cases in which it is ordered, the right to the presumption of innocence should be considered when establishing the legitimate reasons that could justify its use. As with any restriction affecting human rights, deprivation of freedom prior to sentencing shall be interpreted restrictively in accordance with the pro homine principle whereby, when recognizing rights, the interpretation most beneficial to the person must be followed and, when restricting or 186 denying rights, the most restrictive interpretation is to be adopted. 135. As the Inter-American Court has ruled, the principle of presumption of innocence also gives rise to “the obligation of the State not to restrict the liberty of a detained person beyond the limits strictly necessary to ensure that he will not impede the efficient development of an investigation and that he will not evade justice. 187 Preventive detention is, therefore, a precautionary rather than a punitive measure.” Therein lies the importance of the criterion of reasonableness in the enforcement of this measure. Keeping a person incarcerated for longer than is reasonable for meeting the 188 goals sought with detention would equate, in practice, to anticipating the sentence. In addition, Art. 7.5 of the Convention itself “imposes temporal limits on the duration of 184 See also ECHR, Case of Allenet de Ribemont v. France (Application 15175/89), Judgment of February 10, 1995 (Grand Chamber), para. 35. 185 IACHR, Application from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Case 12.554, Francisco Usón Ramírez, July 25, 2008, para. 168. 186 IACHR, Report No. 86/09, Case 12.553, Merits, Jorge, José, and Dante Peirano Basso, Uruguay, August 6, 2009, paras. 71 and 75. 187 I/A Court H.R., Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206, para. 121; I/A Court H.R., Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 180; I/A Court H.R., Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77. 188 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, para. 69; I/A Court H.R., Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para. 111; I/A Court H.R., Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 180; I/A Court H.R., Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay. Judgment of September 2, 2004, Series C No. 112, para. 229; I/A Court H.R., Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77. See also IACHR, Report No. 86/09, Case 12.553, Merits, Jorge, José, and Dante Peirano Basso, Uruguay, August 6, 2009, para. 133; IACHR, Report No. 2/97, Case 11.205, Merits, Jorge Luis Bronstein and others, Argentina, March 11, 1997, para. 12; IACHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, Ch. IV, para. 34.