III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE USE OF PRETRIAL DETENTION A. The right to the presumption of innocence and the principle of exceptionality 131. Of all the judicial guarantees that pertain to criminal justice, perhaps the most basic is the right to be presumed innocent, which is expressly recognized, without any reservations or exceptions, by several international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 11.1), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 14.2), the American Declaration 179 (Art. XXVI), and the American Convention (Art. 8.2). 132. This standard provides that the accused must be assumed innocent and be treated as such until his criminal responsibility has been established by means of a final judgment. The principle of presumption of innocence demands that a conviction – and, consequently, the application of a penalty – may only be founded upon the court’s certainty regarding the existence of a punishable act attributable to the accused. The judge responsible for hearing the case is under the obligation to approach it without prejudice and must on no account assume a priori that the accused is guilty. This presumption of innocence has led modern criminal law to impose the general rule that all persons indicted in criminal proceedings must be tried at liberty and that only by 180 exception may suspects be deprived of their freedom (principle of exceptionality). If it is necessary to detain a person during a trial, the legal status of the accused continues to 181 be that of an innocent person. Accordingly, and as consistently noted in this report, the right to the presumption of innocence is the point of departure for any analysis of 182 the rights and treatment of persons in pretrial detention. 133. The IACHR again notes that the American Convention must be interpreted in such a way that its provisions have a useful effect: in other words, they 183 must effectively serve the protective purpose for which they were created. Substantively, this means that its terms must be interpreted in such a way as to guarantee that the rights it establishes are practical and effective and not theoretical or 179 IACHR, Report No. 50/00, Case 11.298, Merits, Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart, Venezuela, April 13, 2000, para. 118. Not only is this principle contained in treaty law, it is also set forth in other international instruments dealing with people deprived of freedom, such as Principle 36 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. 180 IACHR, Report No. 50/00, Case 11.298, Merits, Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart, Venezuela, April 13, 2000, para. 119. Similarly: IACHR, Report No. 86/09, Case 12.553, Merits, Jorge, José, and Dante Peirano Basso, Uruguay, August 6, 2009, paras. 69 and 70. 181 IACHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, Ch. IV, para. 33. 182 IACHR, Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Ch. VII, para. 32. 183 I/A Court H.R., Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 37; and I/A Court H.R., Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 55, para. 36.