65 pretrial detention in a specific case, but in no instance should it be used as the guiding criterion for ordering pretrial detention. For example, legally assuming that that circumstance alone constitutes procedural risk would be contrary to the principle of the presumption of innocence. In addition, in no instance should recidivism be examined on the basis of police records or any other documents other than final judgments enacted by the competent courts. 3. The criteria of necessity, proportionality and reasonableness 158. In addition to it being limited to cases in which there are reasonable indications linking the accused to the offense and a legitimate goal to justify its use, pretrial detention must be constrained by principles that should prevail in any democratic society: legality, necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness. Respecting and guaranteeing the right to the presumption of innocence and the exceptional nature of pretrial detention as the most severe measure that can be imposed on a suspect 220 require that it be ordered in accordance with the aforesaid standards. Necessity 159. According to the necessity criterion, pretrial detention, like all other precautionary measures, should be ordered when it is essential for attaining the goals sought. In other words, it should only be admissible when it is the only way to ensure the purposes of the proceedings, after demonstrating that other less restrictive precautionary measures would be unsuccessful in securing those goals. Accordingly, efforts should be made to replace it with a less severe precautionary measure when the circumstances so allow. Thus, it falls to the court under whose authority the detainee is being held to order his liberty, even on an ex officio basis, when the reasons on which the detention was originally based no longer exist. This is because of the precautionary nature of the measure, whereby it can only remain in effect for the duration that is 221 strictly necessary to ensure the procedural goal sought. A person must not be held in pretrial detention for longer than the state can appropriately justify its need; otherwise, 222 the denial of liberty becomes arbitrary. Consequently, the criterion of necessity is not 220 See, using similar language: I/A Court H.R., Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 107; I/A Court H.R., Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No. 152, para. 88; I/A Court H.R., Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, para. 67; I/A Court H.R., Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, para. 106; I/A Court H.R., Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para. 74; I/A Court H.R., Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 106. 221 IACHR, Report No. 86/09, Case 12.553, Merits, Jorge, José, and Dante Peirano Basso, Uruguay, August 6, 2009, paras. 100, 102, and 105. 222 UN, HRC, Communication No. 1547/2007, Munarbek Torobekov v. Kyrgyzstan, decision of October 27, 2011, CCPR/C/103/D/1547/2007, para. 6.3; UN, HRC, Communication No. 1369/2005, Felix Kulov, decision of July 26, 2010, CCPR/C/99/D/1369/2005, para. 8.3. Similarly, I/A Court H.R., Case of Bayarri v. Argentina. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 30, 2008. Series C No. 187, para. 74.