CAT/C/49/D/416/2010 assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would return. 7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, that “the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable”,11 but it must be personal and present. In this regard, in previous decisions, the Committee has determined that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal.12 The Committee recalls that under the terms of general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 7.4 The Committee further recalls general comment No. 1 (para. 5), according to which the burden to present an arguable case is on the author of a communication. The Committee notes the State party’s submission that in the present case the complainant had failed to substantiate that there is a foreseeable, real and personal risk that he would be subjected to torture by the authorities if returned to China, that his claims had been reviewed by the competent domestic authorities, in accordance with the domestic legislation, and that the latter were “not satisfied that the author was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugee Convention”. However, the Committee is of the view that the author has submitted sufficient details regarding his affiliation with the Falun Gong practice, such as information on the practice, statements of persons who have participated in it together with the complainant, statements of individuals testifying to his arrest and detention by the authorities, as well as medical evidence corroborating his account of having experienced torture while in detention. 7.5 The Committee notes that the above claims and evidence have not been sufficiently verified by the Australian immigration authorities. The Committee observes that the review on the merits of the complainants’ claims regarding the risk of torture that he faced was conducted predominantly based on the content of his initial application for a Protection Visa, which he filed shortly after arriving in the country, without knowledge or understanding of the system. The Committee further observes that the complainant was not interviewed in person either by the immigration department, which rejected his initial application, or by the Refugee Review Tribunal, and therefore he did not have the opportunity to clarify any inconsistencies in his initial statement. The Committee is of the view that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected from victims of torture.13 The Committee further observes that both the Federal Magistrates Court’s decision and the decision of the Federal Court of Australia recognize that the complainant was not informed of the Refugee Review Tribunal’s invitation for a hearing. The Committee also observes that the State party does not dispute that Falun Gong practitioners in China have been subjected to torture, but bases its decision to refuse protection to the complainant in the assessment of his credibility. In this context, the Committee finds that in determining 11 12 13 10 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/53/44 and Corr.1), annex IX, para. 6. See, inter alia, communications No. 258/2004, Dadar v. Canada, decision adopted on 23 November 2005, and No. 226/2003, T.A. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 6 May 2005. See Alan v. Switzerland, communication No. 21/1995, Views adopted on 8 May 1996, para. 11.3.