A capacity-building vehicle As a capacity-building activity, trial-monitoring provides a vehicle to educate and train local lawyers on international standards and domestic law. By hiring local lawyers as monitors and legal advisers, programmes provide interested legal professionals with an opportunity to indirectly engage in the legal reform process. Programme partnerships and the facilitation of domestic monitoring groups also increase the capacity of interested local organizations and networks to engage in monitoring independently or as partners in a trial-monitoring programme. In this way, programmes may facilitate the creation of a local monitoring capacity that will survive beyond the completion of an organization’s own programme. 1.2 Basic principles underlying OSCE trial-monitoring programmes 1.2.1 Principle of non-intervention in the judicial process The principle of non-intervention underlies and informs the trial-monitoring conducted by all OSCE programmes. The principle of non-intervention derives from the fundamental precept that an independent judiciary is the ultimate authority responsible for maintaining the rule of law. This principle requires that all trial-monitoring programmes respect and enhance the independence of the courts through their design and the activities of the monitors. Trial-monitoring programmes should therefore avoid interaction with the judiciary, as this can easily undermine the exclusive decision-making authority of the court. Even where objectively fairer outcomes in individual cases might result from interventions, such interventions have the consequence of compromising the judiciary’s independence, thereby undermining the rule of law and a system based on fair-trial standards. In practice, the application of the principle of non-intervention to all trial-monitoring activities is not always straightforward, and there are differences in approach as to how this principle is applied. Nevertheless, it is commonly agreed that non-intervention means no engagement or interaction with the court regarding the merits of an individual case or attempts to indirectly influence outcomes through informal channels. As a result, all OSCE programmes prohibit such activities. It is also generally agreed that the principle of non-intervention should not serve to limit public criticism of the criminal justice process, nor does it require withholding conclusions regarding problematic practices or procedures. Such conclusions do not improperly interfere with the court’s execution of the laws in individual cases, but provide information regarding overall functioning of the system. Similarly, programme advocacy is directed towards institutional change and not towards achieving specific outcomes in individual cases. Therefore, non-intervention does not equate to an absence of criticism, but to criticism directed at promoting institutional reform. The principle of non-intervention is most tested in those domestic contexts where serious fair-trial and human-rights violations are pervasive. In such situations, the government may be opposed to reform and may not in fact allow the judiciary to function as an independent institution. In such circumstances, monitoring trials for the purpose of supporting long-term reform consistent with the rule of law is unlikely to work. 20 Trial-Monitoring: A Reference Manual for Practitioners