CAT/C/65/D/691/2015 concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned.24 It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. 25 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 26 9.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017), in which it stated, in paragraph 45, that it would assess “substantial grounds” and consider the risk of torture as foreseeable, personal, present and real when the existence of credible facts relating to the risk by itself, at the time of the Committee’s decision, would affect the rights of the complainant under the Convention in the case of his or her deportation. 9.5 The Committee notes the complainant’s claim that she will be ill-treated by her exhusband’s family as well as by her own family because her ex-husband has accused her of infidelity and of living with another man in Sweden. The Committee also notes the State party’s submission that the complainant’s account is merely speculative and based on assumptions, and that the only concrete events on which the complainant’s fear are based are the visit to her parents’ house by her ex-husband’s brothers, certain attempts by his family to call her and her husband’s behaviour in Sweden while they lived together. The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that a threat of violence from close family members or the stigma or dishonour that someone may suffer from a divorce does not, according to the Convention, in itself constitute torture. 9.6 The Committee recalls that article 3 must be interpreted by reference to the definition of torture set out in article 1 of the Convention.27 According to article 1, the term “torture” refers to any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 9.7 Furthermore, the Committee notes the complainant’s claim that, although the Iranian authorities are not aware of her membership in the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, her ex-husband or his family will reveal her membership to the authorities as revenge for having “dishonoured” them, and that once the authorities become aware that she is a member of the party, she will likely be arrested or at least interrogated, which means that she would face torture or sexual abuse, as they are common practice in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Committee also notes that, since the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a party to the Convention, in the event of a violation of the complainant’s rights under the Convention in that State, she would be deprived of the legal option of recourse to the Committee for protection of any kind. In addition, the Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the Migration Agency found that the complainant’s account was not credible and that she had not plausibly demonstrated that her political engagement was such that she would have been of interest to the authorities. 9.8 The Committee notes the complainant’s claim that she has been a member of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan since she was 18 years old, as well as the information contained in the certificate issued by the Party’s office in Paris stating that she left the Islamic Republic of Iran because of oppression by the regime due to her political activities. The Committee also notes, however, the objection by the State party to the effect that the complainant never presented this information before the Swedish authorities. According to the documents submitted by the State party, during her interview with the 24 25 26 27 See, M.S. v. Denmark (CAT/C/55/D/571/2013), para. 7.3. Ibid. Ibid. General comment No. 4, para. 5; see also G.R.B. v. Sweden, para. 6.5. 11