those within the territory of a State Party, they chose language which leaves no doubt as to their intention. 29. Furthermore, any interpretation which construes the scope of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention as not extending to measures whereby a State, acting outside its territory, returns or otherwise transfers refugees to a country where they are at risk of persecution would be fundamentally inconsistent with the humanitarian object and purpose of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. In this context, it is worth recalling the first two paragraphs of the Preamble to the 1951 Convention, which read: “Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination,61 Considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms.” 30. A comprehensive review of the travaux préparatoires 62 confirms the overriding humanitarian object and purpose of the Convention and provides significant evidence that the non-refoulement provision in Article 33(1) was intended to prohibit any acts or omissions by a Contracting State which have the effect of returning a refugee to territories where he or she is likely to face persecution or danger to life or freedom. For example, when the 1951 Convention was in the course of preparation, the SecretaryGeneral stated in a Memorandum dated 3 January 1950 to the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems that “turning a refugee back to the frontier of the country where his life or liberty is threatened… would be tantamount to delivering him into the hands of his persecutors.” 63 During the discussions of the Committee, the representative of the United States vigorously argued that: “[w]hether it was a question of closing the frontier to a refugee who asked admittance, or of turning him back after he had crossed the frontier, or even expelling him after he had been admitted to residence in the territory, the problem was more or less the same. Whatever the case might be, whether or not 61 62 63 One of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), is the right of everyone “to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” under Article 14. Pursuant to Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, supra footnote 35, recourse to the preparatory work of the treaty is a supplementary means of treaty interpretation is permitted only where the meaning of the treaty language is ambiguous or obscure; or where interpretation pursuant to the general rules set out in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. It is a well-established principle that when the meaning of the treaty is clear from its text when viewed in light of its context, object and purpose, supplementary sources are unnecessary and inapplicable, and recourse to such sources is discouraged. See, for example, International Court of Justice, Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 12 (1925), at 22; The Lotus Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (1927), at 16; Admission to the United Nations Case, 1950 ICJ Reports 8. Thus, while UNHCR is of the view that recourse to the drafting history of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention is not necessary given the unambiguous wording of this provision, the travaux préparatoires are nevertheless of interest in clarifying the background, content and scope of Article 33(1). Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons – Memorandum by the Secretary General, U.N. Document E/AC.32/2, 3 January 1950, Comments on Article 24 of the preliminary draft, para. 3. 14