34. In keeping with the above-mentioned rules of treaty interpretation, it is also necessary to have regard to developments in related areas of international law when interpreting the territorial scope of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention. International refugee law and international human rights law are complementary and mutually reinforcing legal regimes. 70 It follows that Article 33(1), which embodies the humanitarian essence of the 1951 Convention and safeguards fundamental rights of refugees, must be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with developments in international human rights law. An analysis of the scope ratione loci of States’ nonrefoulement obligations under international human rights law is particularly pertinent to the question of the extraterritorial applicability of the prohibition on returning a refugee to a danger of persecution under international refugee instruments. 35. As discussed in more detail below, States are bound by their obligations not to return any person over whom they exercise jurisdiction to a risk of irreparable harm. In determining whether a State’s human rights obligations with respect to a particular person are engaged, the decisive criterion is not whether that person is on the State’s national territory, or within a territory which is de jure under the sovereign control of the State, but rather whether or not he or she is subject to that State’s effective authority and control. 36. In its General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the [ICCPR], the Human Rights Committee has stated that “States are required by Article 2(1) [of the ICCPR] to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.” 71 The General Comment reaffirms consistent jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee to the effect that States can “be held accountable for violations of rights under the ICCPR which its agents commit on the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it” 72 and that in certain 70 71 72 Declaration (supra footnote 26); the 1967 Declaration of Territorial Asylum adopted by the General Assembly (supra footnote 27); and Resolution (67) 14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (supra footnote 27). The complementarity between non-refoulement obligations under international refugee and human rights law has been highlighted, for example, in the Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action to Strengthen the International Protection of Refugees in Latin America of 16 November 2004 (available at: http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDLEGAL/424bf6914.pdf, last accessed on 30 October 2006). This Declaration was adopted by Latin American States participating at a gathering to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration. See also Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 79 (XLVII), supra footnote 20; No. 81(XLVII) “General” (1997); Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII) “Safeguarding Asylum” (1997), which specifically refer to the prohibition of return to torture, as set forth in the Convention Against Torture, and Executive Committee Conclusion No. 95 (LIV) “General Conclusion on International Protection” (2003), para. (l) (noting the “complementary nature of international refugee and human rights law as well as the possible role of the United Nations human rights mechanisms in this area …”). General Comment No. 31, supra footnote 41, para. 10. See the decisions of the Human Rights Committee in Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981, para. 12.3; and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979, 29 July 1981, para. 10.3. In both decisions, the Human Rights Committee has also held that “it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.” See also the decision of the 16