provide for some monitoring mechanism. However, in extraditions to Central Asian States, this mechanism is usually limited to monitoring by diplomatic staff of the sending country and does not envisage the establishment of any independent monitoring system.35 In the face of the existence of a real risk of torture or other ill-treatment, it has been the consistent approach of both this Court and UN Treaty Bodies in extradition cases from the Russian Federation to Central Asian States to refuse to accept as sufficient safeguards against refoulement mere references to diplomatic assurances, or to the purported adherence to international treaties prohibiting torture, or to the existence of domestic mechanisms established to protect human rights.36 In the recent case of Tadzhibayev v. Russia, this Court found that a diplomatic assurance provided to the Russian Federation by the Kyrgyzstan authorities was not sufficient to protect against refoulement to face a risk of torture or other ill-treatment, contrary to article 3 ECHR. The Court found that the Kyrgyzstan authorities had not “demonstrated the existence of an effective system of legal protection against torture that could act as an equivalent to the system required of Contracting States. Moreover, it ha[d] not been demonstrated … that Kyrgyzstan’s commitment to guaranteeing access to the applicant by Russian diplomatic staff would lead to effective protection against proscribed ill-treatment in practical terms, as it has not been shown that the aforementioned staff would be in possession of the expertise required for effective assessment of the Kyrgyz authorities’ compliance with their undertakings. Nor was there any guarantee that they would be able to speak to the applicant without witnesses. In addition, their potential involvement was not supported by any practical mechanism setting out, for instance, a procedure by which the applicant could lodge complaints with them or for their unfettered access to detention facilities.”37 V. The use of notices in the CIS region When issuing an arrest warrant and/or an extradition request for a person suspected to be outside of the country’s jurisdiction, CIS States can communicate such request via both Interpol and the ‘Interstate wanted persons database’ operated within the CIS framework.38 Interpol will transmit the request via its Red Notice system and send it “to all the Organization’s Members”.39 According to its Constitution, INTERPOL must respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights40 and the strict prohibition not “to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”41 However, 35 See e.g. Assurances issued by Kyrgyzstan to the Russian Federation in case of Abdilaziz Khamrakulov Khamrakulov v Russia, no.68894/13 § 69, 16 April 2015; assurances issued by Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan in case of "29 Uzbek refugees" (Abdusamatov and 28 Others v Kazakhstan, CCPR, 2011). 36 See, X. v the Russian Federation, CAT, Communication no. 542/2013, UN Doc. CAT/C/54/D/542/2013, 30 June 2015; Rustamov v. Russia, no. 11209/10, 3 July 2012; Umirov v. Russia, no. 17455/11, 18 September 2012, Azimov v Russia, no. 67474/11, § 133, 18 April 2013, Khamrakulov v Russia, op cit; Abdusamatov and 28 Others v Kazakhstan, op cit; Khairullo Tursunov v Kazakhstan, CAT, Communication No. 538/2013, 2015, para. 9.10. 37 Tadzhibayev v. Russia, Application no. 17724/14, 1 December 2015, para.46. 38 The database allows for exchange of information on wanted suspects and fugitives between CIS countries. It is operated by the Russian Federation's Federal government agency "The Main Information and Analytical Centre of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation” within the framework of the CIS Interstate Information Bank (MIB). In late August 2015, Ukraine announced that it will cease operation of the database on its territory due to Russia's failure to detain and extradite former Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovich and members of his family. 39 Resolution III/IRPD/GA/2011 (2014), article 1.13. 40 Article 2, INTERPOL Constitution 41 Article 3, INTERPOL Constitution. The scope of this article covers "offences of a predominantly political, racial or religious character .... even if - in the requesting country - the facts amount to an offence against the ordinary law", Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7, 2. If some countries do not execute the extradition request based on article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution, “this is reported to the other NCBs in an addendum to the original notice indicating that the offender has been released”, (para 9) but it does not invalidate the request per se. The General Assembly of Interpol identified the following offences as 5