research by the NGO Fair Trials International has found that INTERPOL had not been applying these guarantees consistently in practice.42 For example, it has documented that “the Russian Federation implements its devolved responsibilities by a set of instructions to law enforcement agents agreed by various agencies including the Federal Security Service … which simply reiterates that ‘the international search for persons alleged to have committed crimes of a political, military, religious or racial character is not performed.’ … [T]his has not stopped Russia seeking to abuse INTERPOL’s system.”43 In the INTERPOL system, the entities primarily responsible for filtering information, for providing regular review and, therefore, for the application of these safeguards, including “obligations under international law”, 44 are the National Country Bureaus (NCBs), the offices designated by Member States as the proxy of INTERPOL in the country. 45 The General Secretariat retains a screening role, and must provide a preliminary review of Red Notices and supervision.46 A Commission for the Control of Files (CCF) can process individual complaints for insertion in the Red Notices database.47 However, by its own admission, it does not have the power to delete them or issue binding opinions. 48 Within the framework of the ‘CIS Interstate wanted persons database’, law enforcement agencies can send requests to conduct search and arrest operations. The requesting warrant is treated as having the legal force of a domestic warrant. Once the wanted person is found, the relevant authority informs their counterparts.49 This information normally triggers extradition proceedings and serves as a basis for preparation of extradition requests by the State that has jurisdiction over the requested person. There is a considerable difference in the remedies available in regard to these two databases. Unlike with INTERPOL system, the CIS database does not explicitly provide for a mechanism ensuring that persons sought on political or other protected grounds are not placed on the wanted list. No complaint mechanism is contemplated in its recently adopted working rules, 50 which clarify the procedure for operating the falling per se under article 3: “membership of a prohibited organization, the expression of certain prohibited opinions, offences involving the press, insulting the authorities, offences against the internal or external security of the State, desertion from the armed forces, treason, espionage, practicing a prohibited religion, recruitment or propaganda for particular religions, membership of a racial association” and “acts committed by politicians in connection with their political activities, even if those concerned are prosecuted after their fall from power and, in some cases, after they have fled abroad. The situation is different in the case of an offence committed by a politician acting as a private individual”, Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7, II.1-2. However, “(w)hen offences are committed by persons with definite political motives but when the offences committed have no direct connection with the political life of the offenders' country or the cause for which they are fighting, the crime may no longer be deemed to come within the scope of Article 3. This is particularly true when offences are committed in countries which are not directly involved (i.e. outside the "conflict area") and when the offences constitute a serious threat to personal freedom, life or property. Offences committed outside the conflict area in order to draw attention to a particular cause (aircraft hijackings, the taking of hostages, kidnappings) do not come within the scope of Article 3.” (III.3-4) 42 Fair Trials International, Strengthening respect for human rights, strengthening INTERPOL, November 2013, para. 110. 43 ibid, para. 135. 44 Resolution III/IRPD/GA/2011 (2014), article 34.3.e 45 ibid, article 9.4, article 10.3, article 11.2, article 21.2.b, article 17.2-4, article 34.1-2 46 Resolution III/IRPD/GA/2011 (2014), articles 86, 22.5, 74, 123.4, 131, 17.5-6 24.1.b, 51, 81. 47 article 36, Constitution; articles 1 and 18, Rules on the Control of Information and Access to Interpol’s Files 48 2012 CCF Annual Report, para. 95. See also, Florence de VILLENFAGNE and Claire GAYREL, DATA PROTECTION AT ICPOINTERPOL ASSESSMENT, ISSUES AND OUTLOOK, CRIDS Centre de Recherche Information, Droit et Société (Information, Law and Society Research Centre) Notre Dame de la Paix University Namur, Belgium, 29 April 2011, p. 54. 49 The Rules on the CIS Interstate wanted persons database provides that detention is conducted on the basis of the arrest request contained in the search request; the procedural document that serves as basis for detention under these Rules are requested thereafter (§26.1). The Rules also stipulate the detaining entity informed a supervising judicial body or prosecutor's office of the arrest and subsequent review of the request for detention by the searching state is reviewed on the basis of domestic law of the detaining state, i.e. review of the lawfulness and validity for detention is dependent on the domestic legal system of the country on whose territory the person was apprehended. 50 The Rules (Регламент компетентных органов по осуществлению межгосударственного розыска лиц) were adopted on 30 October 2015 by the Decision of the Heads of Governments of CIS States on the Rules for authorized bodies on conducting the Interstate search for wanted persons, at the Dushanbe Summit of CIS States, although the database itself has been in existence and operations for many years prior, based on the CIS Agreement for cooperation between Ministries 6