CAT/C/62/D/683/2015 where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to the Sudan. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 31 7.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable (para. 6), the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk. 32 The Committee further recalls that, in accordance with its general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by the organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, under article 22 (4) of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in each case. 33 7.5 In assessing the risk of torture in the present case, the Committee notes the complainant’s claims that he was detained in the Sudan, that he was interrogated several times and that his hand and leg were broken while in detention. It also notes his claim that, if removed to the Sudan, he would face a real risk of torture from the Sudanese authorities, due to his political profile resulting from his membership of the Swiss branch of the Justice and Equality Movement, his participation at meetings of its high-level members and his role as the Movement’s secretary for social and media affairs. The Committee further notes that, to support his allegations, the complainant referred to reports of an intensified crackdown on political activists, in particular individuals from Darfur. He also argued that not only leaders or high-profile figures of political movements are at risk of being detained, ill-treated and tortured in the Sudan, but anyone who opposes or is suspected of opposing the current regime, and that this risk may increase if the person concerned has spent a long time abroad. 7.6 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the occurrence of flagrant and systematic violations of human rights in the country of origin cannot, of itself, constitute a sufficient reason to conclude that the complainant would be at risk of being subjected to torture if removed to the Sudan. It also notes the State party’s claim that, regardless of the generally volatile security and human rights situation in his country of origin, and in Darfur in particular, the complainant has not demonstrated to the Swiss asylum authorities that he would face a personal risk of being subjected to torture if removed to the Sudan due to his alleged profile as an opposition member of the Swiss branch of the Justice and Equality Movement. The Committee further notes the State party’s argument that the complainant’s claims of his past exposure to torture and ill-treatment and in particular the circumstances in which he allegedly sustained injuries while in detention in the Sudan were not considered 31 32 33 10 See, for example, E.K.W. v. Finland (CAT/C/54/D/490/2012), para. 9.3. See A.R. v. the Netherlands (CAT/C/31/D/203/2002), para. 7.3; Kalonzo v. Canada (CAT/C/48/D/343/2008), para. 9.3; X v. Denmark (CAT/C/53/D/458/2011), para. 9.3; and W.G.D. v. Canada (CAT/C/53/D/520/2012), para. 8.4. See T.D. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/46/D/375/2009), para. 7.7; and Alp v. Denmark (CAT/C/52/D/466/2011), para. 8.3.