CCPR/C/123/D/2785/2016 to corroborate his claim of duress, he was not allowed to do so. The Committee further notes the State party’s arguments that Mr. Humaam made a confession once before the police and twice before a judge; that he only made the claims about duress at a later stage after having changed his team of lawyers; that it is for the defence to substantiate the claim of duress, not the State party; that in any case a confession cannot be retracted under sharia when a defendant is thought to be of sound mind, which the court adjudged Mr. Humaam to be in the absence of evidence to the contrary; and that the confession was not the sole basis upon which Mr. Humaam was convicted, as his confession only corroborated a multitude of other evidence. 9.3 The Committee firstly recalls that, once a complaint about ill-treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant has been made, including psychological pressure to make a confession, a State party must investigate it promptly and impartially. 17 It further recalls its general comment No. 32 (2007) on article 14: right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, in which it stated that the safeguards set out in article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or undue psychological pressure from the investigating authorities on the accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. 18 The Committee notes that, despite numerous claims by Mr. Humaam that he had been forced to confess guilt under duress, the State party did not allow Mr. Humaam to present evidence or call witnesses to support his claims and did not conduct any investigation into those allegations. Regarding the State party’s contention that Mr. Humaam bore the burden of proof in establishing that the confession was extracted under duress and was not voluntary, the Committee recalls that it is implicit in article 14 (3) (g) that, once a defendant raises credible claims that a confession was made under duress, the prosecution bears responsibility for establishing that the confession was given voluntarily. The Committee notes in this respect that the failure of the State party to allow Mr. Humaam to present evidence to support the claim or to independently investigate it shows that this obligation was not met, especially since Mr. Humaam was in detention at the time, and that the State party has failed to provide the recording of the interview as required by domestic law. The Committee concludes that, by placing the burden of proof that his confession was made under duress on Mr. Humaam and failing to allow him to present evidence to support this claim, the State party violated article 14 (3) (g). Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the facts before it disclose a violation of Mr. Humaam’s rights under article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant. 9.4 In connection with the author’s claim that Mr. Humaam’s confession was obtained in the absence of his defence lawyer, the Committee notes the State party’s statement that Mr. Humaam refused the services of the lawyer appointed by the authorities to represent him. The Committee recalls its general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, in which it states that, in cases involving capital punishment, it is axiomatic that the accused must be effectively assisted by a lawyer at all stages of the proceedings and that the interests of justice may, in the case of a specific trial, require the assignment of a lawyer against the wishes of the accused, particularly in cases of persons facing a grave charge but being unable to act in their own interests. 19 In the present case, the Committee notes the author’s claim that the early proceedings were conducted in circumstances that were not conducive to protecting Mr. Humaam’s procedural rights, including the author’s unrefuted claims that Mr. Humaam’s interview was conducted in a distant location, without the video recording that is required by domestic law, and that the State party did not ensure effective access to counsel at the early stages of the proceedings (see paras. 7.2–7.5). It further notes that the State party only gave Mr. Humaam 10 days to obtain private counsel; did not appoint counsel, albeit against his wishes, in the event of his failure to retain private counsel; failed to ensure that Mr. Humaam was capable of acting in his own interests, as concluded in paragraph 9.5, below; and recorded the confession in court without counsel before charges had been laid. Under these circumstances, the Committee concludes that the facts as submitted by the author 17 18 19 12 See Amanklychev v. Turkmenistan (CCPR/C/116/D/2078/2011). See Kovaleva et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/106/D/2120/2011). Ibid., paras. 37–38.