Dismantling the Tools ofreport Oppression INTERPOL 2018 b. the lack of a requirement for an arrest warrant to be provided along with the Red Notice or Diffusion request; and c. the absence of continual review of the ‘effectiveness’ of INTERPOL alerts, to determine whether an extradition request has been made following apprehension and, if so, whether it was successful. 33. We recommended that INTERPOL should: a. make public information about how it approaches the task for reviewing INTERPOL alerts; b. conduct proactive background research into the requesting country’s human rights record and provide more disclosure about the extent to which it does this; c. require NCBs to supply arrest warrants, either at the point of requesting a notice or promptly thereafter if the matter is urgent; and d. institute a practice whereby the General Secretariat, when informed of an arrest, systematically follows up with the NCB of the arresting country either six or 12 months after the event and asks standard questions as to whether an extradition request was made and whether this was accepted or refused, and on what grounds. 34. INTERPOL’s processes for reviewing alerts were further compromised by the operation of the i-link system. As explained above, Red Notices are not formally issued until the General Secretariat has checked them to ensure that they comply with INTERPOL’s rules. The i-link system, however, enabled NCBs to put requests for Red Notices directly onto INTERPOL’s databases, making them immediately visible to all other NCBs. Although INTERPOL had systems that made it possible for NCBs to distinguish between formal Red Notices and mere requests that had not been reviewed, i-link nevertheless allowed issuing NCBs to upload information about wanted persons onto INTERPOL’s systems without any scrutiny. 35. Fair Trials’ understanding was that requests for Red Notices were reviewed relatively quickly, usually within 24 hours, but even within this short period of time, unchecked information about wanted individuals was accessible to NCBs across the world through INTERPOL’s systems. We had concerns that this information could be copied by Member States prior to any review, and subsequently kept in national police databases even if the General Secretariat later decided to reject the request. Although INTERPOL could notify NCBs that it had refused to publish a Red Notice, it had no powers to compel the Member States to delete or amend data on their national databases. In effect, the operation of the i-link system made it possible for abusive requests for the arrests of individuals to infiltrate national police databases via INTERPOL’s systems. 36. We recommended to INTERPOL that there should be changes to how i-link operates so that requests for Red Notices are not visible to other NCBs. Effective avenue of redress 37. Fair Trials is not aware of any cases to date in which individuals have successfully challenged INTERPOL’s decisions in national courts. This is because INTERPOL does not have a physical presence in most countries, and in countries where it does have a presence, such as in France, the United States, and Singapore, it is protected from the jurisdiction of national courts by formal immunity agreements and national laws.21 INTERPOL’s Headquarters Agreement with France, in particular, makes INTERPOL’s For example, Agreement between the International Criminal Police Organisation – INTERPOL and the Government of the French Republic Regarding INTERPOL’s Headquarters in France (24 April 2008), and International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) (ICPO-INTERPOL) Order 2012 (Singapore) (20 August 2012) 21 19