Dismantling the Tools ofreport Oppression INTERPOL 2018 Any decision by NCBs to refuse disclosure should be subject to proper scrutiny by the CCF, so that in practice, information is only withheld from individuals where there are genuine reasons to justify this. At present, there are some questions about the extent to which the new rules of disclosure are promoting transparency. In Dolkun Isa’s case, for example, it was evident that the CCF felt bound by NCB Beijing’s insistence that no data should be disclosed, as a result of which the CCF did not even confirm whether or not there was a Red Notice against him. This was notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had made public statements that Dolkun was subject to a Red Notice. It seemed in this context there was no justifiable reason for refusing to disclose any information, even to confirm whether or not there was any data regarding Dolkun on INTERPOL’s systems. 97. Currently, there are very few ways of finding out how effectively the CCF is applying the new rules on disclosure, because the CCF does not provide detailed responses to individuals when it has decided to restrict access to information. However, it seems that the CCF is still in the process of developing its procedures regarding the disclosure of information, and we have started to see, in some cases where the CCF has refused disclosure, that it identifies which of the four exceptions under Article 35(3) justified the withholding of information. We can also tell from some written decisions of the CCF, (explained further below) regarding requests for the removal of Red Notices, that the CCF is actively engaging in discussions with NCBs to encourage them to disclose data to individuals where it believes that withholding of information cannot be justified. 98. The disclosure requirements, including the permitted restrictions, apply both to the NCB and to the individual applicant, and the General Secretariat is also able to request that disclosure is withheld. There are some concerns that,far from making CCF procedures transparent, both the NCBs and individuals might be inclined to overuse the provisions of Article 35(3) to restrict access to information, making it more difficult to make decisions on individual complaints by seeking responses to arguments put forward by both parties. 99. It is worth noting that the previous Article 14(5) of the old Operating Rules, which created a presumption of disclosure in cases where the applicant could demonstrate knowledge of the existence of an INTERPOL alert, has not been replicated in the new CCF Statute or Operating Rules. It is assumed that this is because new broader presumptions of disclosure now apply, and this is unlikely to create significant changes in practice given our experience that this provision did not, in fact, lead to disclosure in such cases. “The Commission certainly understands the importance of the presumption of the confidentiality of the data processed by INTERPOL. However, a delicate balance needs to be found between the requirements of national sovereignty and the specific needs of international police cooperation on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of an individual to due process of law on the other.”97 Nina Vajic, Former Chair of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files Nina Vajic, ‘Speech by the CCF Chair to the INTERPOL General Assembly’ (9 November 2016) Available at: https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/ Speeches/2016/2016-General-Assembly-%E2%80%93-Speech-by-Ms-Nina-Vaji%C4%87,-Chairperson-of-the-CCF/ 97 45