files ‘inviolable’. This is understood to mean that any action by national authorities in relation to those files is precluded, including by way of judicial oversight. 38. In 1978, France passed its cornerstone law on data protection, establishing the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (‘CNIL’), an independent supervisory authority with the power to grant individuals access to public authorities’ files which related to them. INTERPOL’s files are not within the jurisdiction of this body, but as a condition for this exemption, INTERPOL established what eventually became the CCF as its own data protection mechanism. 39. The CCF was initially set up as a supervisory body, but its role has since evolved, and it is now also responsible for handling requests from individuals who wish to gain access to, and seek deletion of, information concerning them which is stored on INTERPOL’s files. Although in theory, individuals affected by INTERPOL alerts should be able to seek redress from the countries that issued the alert, this is not a realistic option for many individuals, who may, for example, be facing persecution, or be dealing with a broken legal system that offers no realistic hope of justice. This means that, in reality, many individuals have no avenue of redress when faced with an abusive INTERPOL alert other than through the CCF. 40. The CCF’s role is significant not only for the individuals who wish to avail themselves of the remedies which it offers, but also for INTERPOL which relies on the CCF to justify its immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts. International bodies which are not subject to the jurisdiction of national or regional authorities should provide their own remedies so as not to leave the individual in a vacuum of legal protection.22 20 41. Fair Trials has demonstrated how the CCF did not offer an effective avenue of redress, noting in particular: a. The inadequate expertise of CCF members: At the time of publication of Strengthening INTERPOL, and as required by the Rules on the Control of Information and Access to INTERPOL’s Files, the CCF was staffed by five members – three data protection experts, a computer expert and a police cooperation expert – none of whom had significant background in key areas including criminal law, extradition and asylum and general human rights law. It was also understaffed and under-resourced, with the CCF’s budget for 2012 less than 0.2% of INTERPOL’s overall budget. b. The lack of equality of arms: While there was a procedure through which people could seek access to the data relating to them stored on INTERPOL’s files through the CCF, we knew of only a very small number of cases in which this procedure had resulted in disclosure. Further, proceedings before the CCF did not ensure equality of arms as the applicant was not able to comment on the observations and evidence of the NCB. This issue was caused, in part, by INTERPOL’s adherence to the “national sovereignty” principle, under which all data recorded on INTERPOL’s databases is ultimately controlled by the NCB that supplied it.23 This meant that whenever individuals attempted to gain access to information about them on INTERPOL’s systems, the CCF could not disclose any information unless it had permission from the NCB to do so. While we recognised that in the policing context, full transparency is not possible, the practice of keeping applicants completely in the Joined Cases C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351 (‘Kadi’); Waite and Kennedy v Germany, App No 27083/94 (24 February 1997); and Nada v Switzerland, App No 10593/08 (12 September 2012) 23 This principle is now clarified in the amended RPD, Art 7(1) 22