D. Drivers of reform 51. Since Fair Trials began its campaign to highlight and prevent the misuse of INTERPOL, we have witnessed INTERPOL shifting firmly into ‘reform mode’. At the 84th INTERPOL General Assembly session in Rwanda, Secretary General Jürgen Stock urged members to ‘be ambitious’ and ‘work together to shape a powerful reform agenda’.28 52. Under the leadership of Stock’s predecessor, Ronald K. Noble, efficiency had been INTERPOL’s priority, with the number of INTERPOL alerts in circulation and the speed with which they were published as the main indicators of success. It was clearly known to the organisation that INTERPOL alerts were not always justified, but it was apparent that INTERPOL did not recognise its responsibility to do more to prevent its systems from being misused in ways that violated its neutrality, or international human rights standards.29 “If your view of the world is that because of a handful of difficult cases the entire system should be shut down, then you are entitled to that view…. My view is that the world is so dangerous, and it’s so easy for criminals to move from one country to another country, that having countries alerted as quickly as possible that someone is wanted for arrest is important. We’ve only had a problem with 0.5 per cent of cases. These are very small complaints within a big picture.”30 Ronald K. Noble, Former Secretary General of INTERPOL a) INTERPOL’s Immunity 54. The need to protect INTERPOL’s legal immunity was undoubtedly a key driver of reform. As stated above, INTERPOL is immune from the jurisdiction of national courts, primarily due to bilateral agreements with certain states. It is now increasingly well-established, however, that international bodies which are not subject to the jurisdiction of national or regional authorities should provide their own remedies, so as not to leave the individual in a vacuum of legal protection. This has led to acceptance that national courts can only decline to adjudicate claims against international organisations if the affected individual has access to a remedy within the organisation. This doctrine has been elaborated by the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECtHR’), which has held that immunities granted to international organisations are permissible under the European Convention on Human Rights (the ‘ECHR’) only if the person concerned ‘[has] available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention’.31 55. Analogous principles have been developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) in its judgments concerning EU measures implementing United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) Resolutions imposing sanctions against individuals. In the case of Kadi,32 the Jürgen Stock, INTERPOL Secretary General, Directional Statement at 84 th INTERPOL General Assembly Session, 2 November 2015 Ronald K. Noble, ‘INTERPOL makes the world a safer place; Far from showing the need for reform, the recent case of William Browder highlights how INTERPOL protects individuals and its member states’ 30 Jake Wallis Simons, ‘INTERPOL: who polices the world’s police?’, Daily Telegraph (8 May 2014) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/10801997/ Interpol-who-polices-the-worlds-police.html 28 29 24 53. INTERPOL’s ethos appears to have shifted somewhat under Stock’s leadership. The organisation seems to have become more conscious of the potentially devastating impact of notices and diffusions and better aware of the risks that it would itself face if it fails to prevent the misuse of its systems. We have identified four main drivers of the reforms ushered in during Stock’s tenure as the Secretary General.