Changes to the composition of the CCF Old CCF Composition Chairperson (senior judicial/data protection expert) Two data protection experts Electronic data processing expert Expert in police and international cooperation New CCF Composition Supervisory and Advisory Chamber Data protection expert Expert on electronic data processing Requests Chamber Data protection expertise Expertise in police matters, especially internationalcooperation Expertise in international criminal law Expertise on human rights Senior judicial/prosecutorial position, preferably with expertise on international cooperation Better transparency and respect for the equality of arms 94. The rules governing disclosure of evidence by the CCF have been significantly reformed, creating a presumption that information “shall be accessible to the applicant”.94 NCBs are only able to prevent disclosure if they have good reasons for doing so, and these reasons are given in Article 35(3) of the CCF Statute as (a) to prevent public or national security or to prevent crime; (b) to protect the confidentiality of an investigation or prosecution; (c) to protect the rights and freedoms of the applicant or third parties; and (d) to enable the Commission or INTERPOL to properly discharge their duties. Where any of the above restrictions apply, the decision not to provide disclosure must be justified and an effort should be made to provide whatever information is possible, for example in the form of summaries.95 95. The failure by an NCB to provide justification for withholding disclosure does not, however, lead to the automatic 44 CCF Statute, Article 35(1). CCF Statute, Article 35(4). 96 CCF Statute, Article 35(4). 94 95 disclosure of the content of the information but the CCF may take the lack of justification into consideration when assessing and deciding on the request.96 So far, the CCF has not clarified how exactly it takes into consideration the fact that disclosure has been refused when it is making its determinations in complaints proceedings. The CCF decisions we have seen so far, recognise that the refusal to disclose information regarding data on INTERPOL’s systems undermine the adversarial nature of the complaints proceedings, by compromising the individual’s ability to challenge the data properly. The decisions do not make it clear how exactly the CCF addresses the unfairness, only that it takes the ‘imbalance’ between the parties into consideration. 96. The new rules on disclosure have not replaced the “national sovereignty” principle, and given that the CCF continues to view the NCBs as the ultimate controllers of the data that they supply to INTERPOL, it remains the case that the CCF does not disclose any information to individuals before seeking permission from the NCB.