CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 the Convention. In accordance with article 72 (4) of its rules of procedure, it must do so before considering the merits of the communication. 8.2 In accordance with article 4 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee is satisfied that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 8.3 The author complains before the Committee that she and her daughter were the object of violence by her ex-spouse and the father of her daughter during several years and that this violence culminated on 24 April 2003 with the murder of the child during one of the unsupervised visits authorized by judicial decision some months previously. She asserts that prior to the murder she had made known to the administrative and judicial authorities the abuses she was enduring from her ex-husband and asked for protection. 8.4 The Committee notes that some of the abuses and complaints before the authorities occurred before 6 October 2001, the date of entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Spain. The Committee lacks jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine these facts individually, in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2 (e) of the Optional Protocol. Accordingly, the Committee will take them into account only to the extent that they explain the context of events that occurred after the entry into force of the Protocol for Spain. 8.5 The Committee also observes that after the entry into force of the Protocol there were two especially important judicial decisions regarding the events leading up to the child’s death, namely, the order of 5 May 2002 of the Juzgado núm. 1 de Navalcarnero (Court No. 1 of Navalcarnero) authorizing the regime of unsupervised visits; and the decision of 17 June 2002, denying the appeal by which the author had objected to said regime. The latter decision was not subject to appeal. Since these two decisions were taken after the entry into force of the Protocol, the Committee is not barred under article 4, paragraph 2 (e) of the Protocol from examining facts deriving from those decisions. 8.6 With respect to the exhaustion of internal remedies, the Committee notes the observations of the State party that the author did not exhaust those remedies, since she should have alleged before the courts the apparent existence of a judicial error instead of a miscarriage of justice. With regard to this objection, the Committee considers that it must determine whether, in light of the Convention, the author exerted reasonable efforts to bring before national authorities her complaints regarding the violation of rights arising from the Convention. In that regard the Committee notes that, after the death of her daughter, the author interposed several administrative and judicial appeals alleging miscarriage of justice on the part of the State. In particular, two appeals were addressed to the Ministry of Justice, one to the High Court (Audiencia Nacional) and one appeal in cassation to the Supreme Court. In those appeals, the author alleged improper functioning of the administration of justice because the courts, the social services and the Fiscalía (attorney general) had failed in their obligation of due diligence and had erred in allowing an unsupervised visiting scheme between father and daughter. All of those appeals were rejected. In addition, the author filed an appeal in amparo before the Constitutional Court in which she alleged the violation of her fundamental rights with regard to the circumstances that led to the death of her daughter and the lack of redress by the State. This appeal was also rejected, as the Court found that it lacked constitutional relevance. In light of the author’s explanations about the purpose of her appeals, not limited to identifying judicial error, and considering that the State party has not pointed to other possible legal avenues that could have been effective to respond to the specific and complete demands of the author, the 14 14-59288