13 justice, including the sub-set of cases where it renders the trial unfair. The provision plainly envisages cases where evidence should be excluded for broad public policy reasons beyond fairness to the individual accused.’ [26] To those observations I would add: public policy, in this context, is concerned not only to ensure that the guilty are held accountable; it is also concerned with the propriety of the conduct of investigating and prosecutorial agencies in securing evidence against criminal suspects. It involves considering the nature of the violation and the impact that evidence obtained as a result thereof will have, not only on a particular case, but also on the integrity of the administration of justice in the long term.16 Public policy therefore sets itself firmly against admitting evidence obtained in deliberate or flagrant violation of the Constitution. If on the other hand the conduct of the police is reasonable and justifiable, the evidence is less likely to be excluded – even if obtained through an infringement of the Constitution. [27] A plain reading of s 35(5) suggests that it requires the exclusion of evidence improperly obtained from any person, not only from an accused. There is, I think, no reason of principle or policy not to interpret the provision in this way. It follows that the evidence of a third party, such as an accomplice, may also be excluded, where the circumstances of the case warrant it. This is so even with real evidence. As far as I am aware, this is the first case since the advent of our constitutional order where the issue has pertinently arisen. 16 R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 para 31.