CEDAW/C/64/D/67/2014 resubmitted the appeal on 12 May 2010. On 21 June 2010, the Administrative Court decided a minor issue (no deferral of payments for the proceedings), but then sections 01 and 17 of the Court merely shuffled jurisdiction back and forth and did not issue a final decision until 20 March 2013, when the Administrative Court confirmed the decision of the Independent Administrative Panel, stating that it raised no points of law. The author submits that the proceedings befor e the Administrative Court were ineffective due to their excessive duration. In her case, there was a period of inactivity of 2 years and 9 months (from 21 June 2010 to 20 March 2013), while the case was pending for three years (from 23 March 2010 to 20 March 2013). 2.10 The author maintained that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court denies the discriminatory character of the prostitution laws, the enforcement of which resulted in the described events, and for this reason it had repeatedly dismissed complaints about this legislation. Complaint 3.1 The author submitted that she is a victim of discrimination against women, as the State party’s prostitution laws discriminate against women and allow law enforcement to focus on the sex life of women, whereas there are no effective safeguards against abuse. This is evident in the present case: existing safeguards against spying on sex life by means of unlawful undercover investigations were ignored by the police and subsequent remedies were made ineffective by procedural shortcomings. As a result of this deficiency in the legal system, the author suffered from violence against women and human rights violations committed by the police (violations of her private life and of private data protection, intrusions into her private home and degrading treatment). 3.2 The author maintained that illegal prostitution is not a crime but an administrative offence and therefore could not have justified an undercover investigation, as, under section 54 of the Security Police Act, such investigations are permitted only for the purpose of combating crimes, and, under section 35, the minimum requirement for such an investigation is having a specific suspicion of involvement in a serious crime. Nevertheless, the police continued the undercover investigation for four weeks, without having defined in advance the point at which the intrusion into her private life could no longer be justified by the information gained. Under section 28a of the Security Police Act, such an investigation must be a means of last resort, and, under section 29, intrusions into private life must be minimized and kept proportional to the crime being investigated. The same applies under the Code of Criminal Procedure, sections 131 and 133 of which require a determination of the duration of an undercover investigation in advance — if the investigation lasts for several weeks, the crime must be particu larly serious. 3.3 The author also maintained that she was subjected to degrading treatment by means of forced nudity. She referred to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 4 and academic research stating that forced nudity is degrading __________________ 4 16-13831 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v. United Kingdom (application No. 5856/72) of 25 April 1978, in which forced nudity was an aggravating factor; and Human Rights Committee, communication No. 240/1987, Collins v. Jamaica, views adopted on 1 November 1991. 5/20